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# The Diplomatic History Bandwagon: A State of the Field

Thomas W. Zeiler

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An era of innovation among historians of American foreign relations is upon us. Gone are the days when, in 1980, Charles S. Maier could claim that social and cultural history had marginalized the state, implicitly relegating the “languishing” field of diplomatic history to the status of “stepchild” to serious historical scholarship.<sup>1</sup> Grievances against departments that supposedly refuse to hire diplomatic historians or against journals that seemingly shut us out are increasingly rare. The relationship of the field to the profession is no longer characterized by the tired, anecdotal saw of exclusion. Instead, historians of U.S. foreign relations are, in many ways, an advance guard driving the bandwagon of internationalization, riding along with those who study *mentalités* and culture. And that relationship has been reciprocal: while the recent story of U.S. diplomatic history rests on its merger with the majority, the mainstream has also reached out to us.

This essay looks at how, over the past two decades, the study of U.S. foreign relations has stood at the intersection of the domestic and international, of theory and empiricism, of security/politics and the cultural turn. Diplomatic history is a clearinghouse of sorts for work on America in the world, and I seek to illustrate how a sample of diplomatic historians approach their field in ways both new and consistent with trends in the profession at large.<sup>2</sup> This article will consider three (not mutually exclusive) areas in which reform has enlivened the field: traditional realism’s engagement with ideology (*mentalités*), the embrace of international history, and the study of culture and identity. These reforms have redefined the field in ways that confirm the movement of diplomatic history into the mainstream of the historical profession’s interests, and vice versa.

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<sup>1</sup> Charles S. Maier, “Marking Time: The Historiography of International Relations,” in *The Past Before Us: Contemporary Historical Writing in the United States*, ed. Michael Kammen (Ithaca, 1980), 355–56. See also Robert J. McMahon, “Toward a Pluralist Vision: The Study of American Foreign Relations as International History and National History,” in *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, ed. Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson (New York, 2004), 35–39.

<sup>2</sup> My apologies to far too many diplomatic historians who will find their work excluded due to space constraints and the selection of certain topics over others.

## You Are Us

The integration of the field into the larger discipline represents a methodological shift, but it also reveals changing interests of the profession. The field welcomed the international history project launched under the Organization for American Historians's *La Pietra Report*, although that endeavor was undertaken with surprisingly scant participation by historians of American foreign relations. Perhaps it is more accurate to argue, then, that diplomatic historians ride shotgun on the bandwagon of internationalization, rather than steer it entirely. Regardless, the La Pietra effort and the excitement over transnationalism show clearly that the domain once occupied primarily by historians of U.S. foreign relations is now populated by other practitioners of American history. Revealing of this integration, the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR), the flagship organization for diplomatic history, recently honored the borderlands historian Brian DeLay with its prize for best article for his essay on Indians and the Mexican-American War in the *American Historical Review*.<sup>3</sup>

This is a two-way process, with the mainstream's embrace of diplomatic history increasingly evident as well. Several book prizes lend credence to that claim. Vojtech Mastny, Marc Trachtenberg, Matthew Connelly, Mark Lawrence, Mary Renda, Walter LaFeber, Jong Won Lee, Elizabeth Borgwardt, and Paul Kramer, among other historians of foreign relations, have recently won book awards from the American Historical Association (AHA) and Organization of American Historians (OAH).<sup>4</sup> In addition, the work of diplomatic historians has appeared in specialized journals such as the *Journal of Women's History*, *Agricultural History*, the *International Journal of the History of Sport*, and the *Journal of African American History*.<sup>5</sup> Finally, the migration of other scholars into diplomatic history is notable. John Krige, who has applied his expertise in science and technology to American diplomacy in the early Cold War; Carol Anderson, a scholar of race; and Christina Klein, who studies culture, are just three among many who have pollinated the study of U.S. foreign relations from other fields. The editorial board of *Diplomatic History*, the journal of record for the field, has been peopled with scholars from outside (mainly from American

<sup>3</sup> McMahon, "Toward a Pluralist Vision," 36; The Organization of American Historians/New York University Project on Internationalizing the Study of American History, Thomas Bender, director, *La Pietra Report: A Report to the Profession*, 2000, <http://www.oah.org/activities/lapietra/index.html>. Of over 79 participants at the La Pietra meetings, only 5 were diplomatic historians. Brian DeLay, "Independent Indians and the U.S.-Mexican War," *American Historical Review*, 112 (Feb. 2007), 35–68.

<sup>4</sup> The American Historical Association awarded book prizes to Vojtech Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years* (New York, 1996); Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963* (Princeton, 1999); Matthew Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era* (Oxford, 2002); Mark Atwood Lawrence, *Assuming the Burden: Europe and the American Commitment to War in Vietnam* (Berkeley, 2005); and Mary A. Renda, *Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of U.S. Imperialism, 1915–1940* (Chapel Hill, 2001). The following won prizes from the Organization of American Historians: Walter LaFeber, *The Clash: A History of U.S.-Japan Relations* (New York, 1997); Jong Won Lee, *Higashi Ajia reisen to kan-bei-nichi kanke* (U.S.-Korean relations and Japan in East Asia's Cold War) (Tokyo, 1998); Elizabeth Borgwardt, *A New Deal for the World: America's Vision for Human Rights* (Cambridge, Mass., 2005); and Paul A. Kramer, *The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines* (Chapel Hill, 2006).

<sup>5</sup> Molly M. Wood, "Diplomatic Wives: The Politics of Domesticity and the 'Social Game' in the U.S. Foreign Service, 1905–1941," *Journal of Women's History*, 17 (Summer 2005), 142–65; Amy L. S. Staples, "Norris E. Dodd and the Connections between Domestic and International Agricultural Policy," *Agricultural History*, 74 (Spring 2000), 393–403; Thomas W. Zeiler, "A Night at Delmonico's: The Spalding Baseball Tour and the Imagination of Empire," *International Journal of the History of Sport*, 23 (Feb. 2006), 28–45; Yuichiro Onishi, "The New Negro of the Pacific: How African Americans Forged Cross-racial Solidarity with Japan, 1917–1922," *Journal of African American History*, 92 (Spring 2007), 191–214.

studies), such as Melani McAlister, Ricardo Salvatore, Amy Kaplan, and Rob Kroes. So marked is the cross-fertilization between the larger discipline and diplomatic history that calls continue to be heard within the halls of SHAFR for changing the name of the field to reflect its breadth and diversity.<sup>6</sup>

The study of American foreign relations has simply become vital to the rest of the profession. To conclude that diplomatic historians were alarmed by Maier's 1980 critique is an understatement, but they responded with an outburst of scholarship, making them champions of the international turn as well as vigorous proponents of intellectual and cultural history. To be sure, not all students of U.S. foreign relations have embraced those inclinations, but even those who made their careers arguing about the origins of the Cold War, a cottage industry that eventually devolved into circular debates, embarked on a period of self-criticism from the mid-1980s onward. A flurry of attempts to forge an overarching conceptual architecture did not, in the end, produce much more than the still-prevalent notion that William Appleman Williams provides the most compelling interpretation of U.S. foreign affairs for those outside of the field, whether one agrees with him or not. Yet beyond the aura of *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, younger scholars have energized the field.<sup>7</sup>

The result has been a flourishing of scholarship that reflects the vibrancy of the field. Today, SHAFR is a well-endowed, expansive organization with nearly two thousand members from thirty-four nations. It awards seventeen different prizes and grants, sponsors a respected journal and bibliographical guide, and holds a well-attended summer conference. Dedicated to foreign affairs and international history, the online discussion site H-Diplo boasts over four thousand subscribers, making it one of the five largest list servers among the 180 in the H-Net system.<sup>8</sup> Clearly, diplomatic history is in the driver's seat when it comes to the study of America and the world.

But what does diplomatic history offer other fields? Why do they, and should they, read and borrow from us? The answer lies in how historians of American foreign relations conceive of the significance of the state and how they conduct their research in government archives, as well as other sources. In an era when historiography leans heavily on social and cultural history and ferrets out transnational (essentially, nonstate) interactions across borders, diplomatic history reminds us of the significant presence of the state. As

<sup>6</sup> John Krige, *American Hegemony and the Postwar Reconstruction of Science in Europe* (Cambridge, Mass., 2006); Carol Anderson, "International Conscience, the Cold War, and Apartheid: The NAACP's Alliance with the Reverend Michael Scott for South West Africa's Liberation, 1946–1951," *Journal of World History*, 19 (Sept. 2008), 297–325; Christina Klein, *Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945–1961* (Berkeley, 2003). Melani McAlister and Ricardo Salvatore served on the editorial board of *Diplomatic History* from 2005–2007, Amy Kaplan from 2004–2006, and Rob Kroes from 1999–2001. For the name change argument, see, for example, Michael J. Hogan, "The 'Next Big Thing': The Future of Diplomatic History in a Global Age," *Diplomatic History*, 28 (Jan. 2004), 1–21.

<sup>7</sup> See John Lewis Gaddis, "The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War," *Diplomatic History*, 7 (Summer 1983), 171–90; and Michael J. Hogan, "Corporatism: A Positive Appraisal," *ibid.*, 10 (Fall 1986), 363–72. William A. Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (New York, 1972); Lloyd C. Gardner and Thomas J. McCormick, "Walter LaFeber: The Making of a Wisconsin School Revisionist," *Diplomatic History*, 28 (Nov. 2004), 613–24. For William Appleman Williams's continued resonance, see Christopher Layne, *The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present* (Ithaca, 2006).

<sup>8</sup> The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) oversees the journal, *Diplomatic History*, and the bibliography, Thomas W. Zeiler, ed., *American Foreign Relations since 1600: A Guide to the Literature* (Santa Barbara, 2007), <http://www.guidetoamericanforeignrelations.abc-clio.com/ebscripts/toc3.asp>. SHAFR has also initiated a summer institute, designed for faculty and graduate students in all fields. In 2008, the subject was the Vietnam and Iraq wars in historical perspective. *Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations*, <http://www.shafrr.org>. On H-Diplo, see Thomas W. Zeiler, "Is Democracy a Good Thing?," *OAH Newsletter*, 34 (Nov. 2006). The average H-Net list has roughly 600 subscribers.

this essay will show, the field engages in interpretations and research that privilege transnational actors, linguistic constructs, and other measures of the cultural turn. But historians of foreign relations also mesh those interests and sources with an abiding concern with power—a power that emanates as much from the highest political echelons as it does from contact zones. Studying discourse is fruitful, but the state is relegated to a secondary role in American history at the peril of losing a sense of the nature of power, who captures it, who loses it, and how it is deployed. Thus, a subtext of this essay is that diplomatic historians, by investigating both private and public archives, and nation-states as well as transnational exchanges, appreciate how power functions at home and abroad.

Maier's wise warning about the irrelevance of the field because of the irrelevance of the state in historical studies was timely—three decades ago. Diplomatic history has answered his concerns with a myriad of studies that link new methodologies with the time-honored tradition of understanding the state and power. I will argue for pulling the mainstream a bit back toward considerations of the state and for keeping diplomatic history integrated into the general current of scholarship.

### Realities and Discourse: Ideology

In a 2008 forum in *Diplomatic History* on the links between diplomacy and environmental history, the historian Akira Iriye notes new trends among scholars of U.S. foreign relations. They weigh, he argues, the “realities” of geopolitics in the international arena with “discourses,” or expressed or unarticulated images, visions, and ideologies.<sup>9</sup> The decades-old nationalist, revisionist, and realist interpretations remain useful tools of categorization, but, as Iriye implies, the methodological terrain has shifted toward studying other frameworks of meaning. One significant frame centers on *mentalités*—ideas and ideology—as shapers of the U.S. response to the world. Delineating the broad structures of thinking among policy makers has linked the realities of geopolitical circumstances to the ways they are represented by the intangibles of discourse.

In the formulation of Michael Hunt, a foremost proponent of exploring the role of ideas in foreign policy, ideology emanates from a process by which the principles that guide shared beliefs regarding threats, cultural identification, or status are reduced to understandable terms. Jennifer See suggests further that ideology serves both “to motivate and to justify” outlooks and behavior, wiring policy makers with notions of “enemies and allies, dangers and opportunities, us and them.” Core beliefs led American leaders to order the world and their country's place in it.<sup>10</sup> That even the most “realities”-minded Cold War historians have come to see the intersection of ideology, on the one hand, and security and economic concerns, on the other, as a worthwhile subject is a striking recent development in diplomatic history. A list of firmly embedded realists and revisionists who have modernized their studies with a nod to ideology also includes historians who do not focus on the Cold War, which still attracts the bulk of research in the field.

<sup>9</sup> Akira Iriye, “Environmental History and International History,” *Diplomatic History*, 32 (Sept. 2008), 643–46.

<sup>10</sup> Michael H. Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven, 1987), xi; Michael H. Hunt, “Ideology,” in *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, ed. Hogan and Paterson, 222. Jennifer W. See, “Ideology” in *Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy*, ed. Alexander DeConde, Richard Dean Burns, and Fredrik Logevall (New York, 2002), 187–88.

For the earlier period, Williams was a major influence in tying *mentalités* to the state. After Williams posited his Open Door thesis in 1959, Walter LaFeber and others who emphasize the importance of political economy used the doctrine to explain the rise of U.S. power from the late nineteenth century onward. That broad ideology of free enterprise, which incorporated technology, immigration, investment, and trade, rationalized expansive U.S. imperial ambitions in Latin America and Asia. Americans did not eschew military means, LaFeber contends, but they did prefer dollars over force in the pursuit of power abroad. LaFeber also devotes attention to the connection between race and imperial ideology. For instance, Theodore Roosevelt believed that a combination of white superiority and the supremacy of “civilized societies” would thwart barbarians threatening U.S. interests and do so in the name of promoting an environment conducive to American trade penetration. Historians have added to this potent imperial ideology the racial affinities of Anglo-Saxonism and the Anglo-American “special relationship.”<sup>11</sup>

Others have also examined the ideology of earlier periods to effectively analyze American power and policies. In a brief but sophisticated book, Anders Stephanson explores the traditional core beliefs of Manifest Destiny, focusing on the notion of the providential mission of American exceptionalism to produce a synthesis of U.S. history from the Founders to the fall of Communism. Nearly as wide in coverage, Tony Smith’s *America’s Mission* posits “liberal democratic internationalism” as a twentieth-century device with which the United States projected abroad the lessons of its own democratic experience to quell chaos and conflict. Addressing the first half of the century, Emily Rosenberg considers the American dream of equality, abundance, and mobility—what she terms the “ideology of liberal-developmentalism”—that justified the U.S. rise to power. Implicit in that “universal model” for the rest of the world was faith in America’s successful embrace of free markets in goods, services, information, and cultural exchanges, as well as in government stimulation and regulation of international contacts. Thus, even in the dark days of diplomatic history’s ostensible irrelevance, Rosenberg pointed toward U.S. social and cultural norms to elucidate a foreign relations ideology held by the state.<sup>12</sup> Other historians, such as Williams, had long devised ideological frameworks congruent with the 1960s generation of scholars interested in inequality and U.S. imperialism. When it comes to belief systems, few figures garner more attention than Woodrow Wilson, whose principles continue to serve as fodder for studies about U.S. power and empire. As Mark Stoler thoroughly explores in *Allies in War*, a Wilsonian current ran through negotiations on grand strategy and post–World War II planning even as the Soviets, Americans, and British—their belief systems clearly divergent—dealt with the realities of battle during the war.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>11</sup> Walter LaFeber, *The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations*, vol. II: *The American Search for Opportunity, 1865–1913* (Cambridge, Eng., 1993), 10, 45–59, 191; Serge Ricard and Hélène Christol, ed., *Anglo-Saxonism in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1899–1919* (Aix-en-Provence, 1991); John Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations from the Cold War to Iraq* (Houndsmill, 2006).

<sup>12</sup> Anders Stephanson, *Manifest Destiny: American Expansion and the Empire of Right* (New York, 1995); Tony Smith, *America’s Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton, 1994); Emily S. Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890–1945* (New York, 1982), 7. On ideology based on an arrogant sense of national destiny, see Walter L. Hixson, *The Myth of American Diplomacy: National Identity and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven, 2008). On ideology in earlier periods, see Robert W. Smith, *Keeping the Republic: Ideology and Early American Diplomacy* (DeKalb, 2004).

<sup>13</sup> Daniela Rossini, *Woodrow Wilson and the American Myth in Italy: Culture, Diplomacy, and War Propaganda* (Cambridge, Mass., 2008); Frank Ninkovich, *The Wilsonian Century: U.S. Foreign Policy since 1900* (Chicago, 2001); Mark A. Stoler, *Allies in War: Britain and America against the Axis Powers, 1940–1945* (London, 2005). On belief rooted in U.S. postwar leadership, see Michael J. Hogan, *The Ambiguous Legacy: U.S. Foreign Relations in the “American Century”* (Cambridge, Eng., 1999).

In sum, wielding ideology as an explanatory tool has borne the fruit of fresh studies of the nature of pre–Cold War American power and state behavior.

### Cold War Ideologues

To be sure, realist ideology—which privileges geopolitics over domestic sources of power during the Cold War—grabs the largest share of diplomatic historians. Biographies, particularly of stars such as George F. Kennan and Henry Kissinger, proliferate as historians try to grasp the principles, personalities, and beliefs of elite actors. Kennan's principles, for instance, rested on a critique of the blinders worn by moralistic U.S. leaders who crusaded against the evils of international Communism. His criticism proved prescient in regions such as Latin America, where policy makers manifested an obsession with safeguarding the U.S. way of life under the watchful eye of a national security state. These realist policy makers pressed their Cold War ideology even when it meant subsuming economic concerns. A “rally-around-the-flag” ideology also underpinned the *mentalités* of other U.S. groups in the Cold War, as John Fousek argues. Thus, an elite-based “ideology of American nationalist globalism” persuaded “out-groups” such as minorities and workers to curb their militant protests and support the Cold War state consensus and the belief that America was obligated, even destined, to confront global Communism.<sup>14</sup> Diplomatic historians are sensitive to the notion that post–World War II American foreign relations were shaped, in part, by ideological considerations.

Two of the best realist historians, John Gaddis and Melvyn Leffler, also turn increasingly to *mentalités*, although skeptics have accused both of disguising their emphases on geopolitical interests in the cloak of ideas. Regardless, both reach beyond the traditional scope of realism to examine ideology. Gaddis bluntly chooses sides in his newest rendition of the superpower conflict, contrasting Bolshevik authoritarianism with the American distrust of concentrated power that stemmed from the “ingenious constitution” written by the freedom-loving Founding Fathers. Rather than target the Soviet Union as the root of all evil, Leffler scrutinizes the “correlations of power,” or the elements that entered American thinking about national security and that were then made manifest in policy. Geopolitical fear of Russian domination influenced Washington's so-called strategy of preponderance, which resulted in a distinctive Cold War ideology comprised of America's “core values, its organizing ideology, and its free political and economic institutions” that configured “an external environment compatible with [Americans'] domestic vision of a good society.” Leffler's latest study of the Cold War pushes even harder on the ideological button. “Governments are run by men and women with ideas and historical memories,”

<sup>14</sup> John Fousek, *To Lead the Free World: American Nationalism and the Cultural Roots of the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, 2000), 10, 11–14. A sampling of biographies include, Jussi Hanhimäki, *The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy* (New York, 2004); Robert L. Beisner, *Dean Acheson: A Life in the Cold War* (New York, 2006); and Randall B. Woods, *LBJ: Architect of American Ambition* (New York, 2006). Books in the Biographies in American Foreign Policy series edited by Joseph A. Fry include, Edward P. Crapol, *James G. Blaine: Architect of Empire* (Lanham, 1999); Clarence E. Wunderlin, *Robert A. Taft: Ideas, Tradition, and Party in U.S. Foreign Policy* (Lanham, 2005); Thomas W. Zeiler, *Dean Rusk: Defending the American Mission Abroad* (Lanham, 1999); and Andrew J. DeRoche, *Andrew Young: Civil Rights Ambassador* (Lanham, 2003). See also the forum “Biography after the Cultural Turn,” *Diplomatic History*, 32 (Nov. 2008). See also Richard H. Immerman, *The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention* (Austin, 1982), 82–105; and Stephen G. Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America* (Chapel Hill, 1999), 17–20. There is no consensus that ideology trumped economics. See David F. Schmitz, *Thank God They're on Our Side: The United States and Right-Wing Dictatorships, 1921–1965* (Chapel Hill, 1999).

he notes, which shape their understanding of the world and inspire their visions.<sup>15</sup> Even if it has not settled old interpretive scores, the emphasis on ideology has led to a continued appreciation of state power through a nuanced appraisal of the Cold War; recent work adds such dimensions as the application of modernization theories to policy, ideas of economic competition among allies, theories of development and aid, and human rights.<sup>16</sup>

The best example of the *mentalité* that privileged the fight against Communism undertaken by the so-called free world gone awry is the Vietnam War. The orthodox interpretation views the conflict as a civil war rather than a global struggle, with shortsighted, self-righteous U.S. policy makers, driven by an ideological disposition to see Communism everywhere, dooming America to war. Sprinkled throughout surveys of Vietnam War-era diplomacy are ideological constructs of anticommunism. For example, the historian George Herring argues that such elements as “the ethos of the Cold War” and a faith in the containment doctrine as an intellectual guide (as well as Lyndon B. Johnson’s concern that losing would undermine his domestic agenda) built a powerful justification for a policy that mired the United States in its longest war to date. Even realists, who generally chafe at ideas as mere distractions when compared to interests and capabilities in interpreting foreign policy, increasingly see ideology as a major consideration in U.S. foreign relations when it comes to the Vietnam War.<sup>17</sup>

That realities meld with discourse is readily apparent in Odd Arne Westad’s study of how the Cold War wrought a Third World capable of transforming the superpower conflict itself. Westad’s work explains the rise to prominence of Third World nations once pushed to the margins of interest, contending that the Americans and Soviets directly intervened in Latin America, Asia, and Africa because of the *mentalités* each struggled to validate. Americans sought an “empire of liberty” based on progress, democracy, and the market, while Moscow pursued an “empire of justice” of equality and modernity spread by Communist ideology. Those ideologies were put into oftentimes brutal action in places such as Vietnam, Nicaragua, and Afghanistan, as those nations devised their own anti-colonial, revolutionary, and antirevolutionary ideas. Eventually, the superpower contest in the Third World caused the collapse of the Communist bloc, but the United States did not escape the global Cold War’s effects. According to Westad, America’s foreign policy

<sup>15</sup> John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History* (New York, 2005), 8; Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, 1992), 13; Melvyn P. Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War* (New York, 2007), 5. On the primacy of ideology (in this case, “visionary globalism”) driving superpower relations, see James Peck, *Washington’s China: The National Security World, the Cold War, and the Origins of Globalism* (Amherst, 2006). On Harry S. Truman and ideology, see Elizabeth Edwards Spalding, *The First Cold Warrior: Harry Truman, Containment, and the Remaking of Liberal Internationalism* (Lexington, Ky., 2006). For skepticism toward realists who refer to ideology, see Hunt, “Ideology,” 238.

<sup>16</sup> Michael E. Latham, *Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and “Nation Building” in the Kennedy Era* (Chapel Hill, 2000); William O. Walker III, “Crucible for Peace: Herbert Hoover, Modernization, and Economic Growth in Latin America,” *Diplomatic History*, 30 (Jan. 2006), 83–117; Jeffrey A. Engel, *Cold War at 30,000 Feet: The Anglo-American Fight for Aviation Supremacy* (Cambridge, Mass., 2007); Amy L. S. Staples, *The Birth of Development: How the World Bank, Food and Agriculture Organization, and World Health Organization Changed the World, 1945–1965* (Kent, 2006); Borgwardt, *New Deal for the World*. Relatedly, scholars exploring non-American Cold War figures also focus on ideology (and ideologues). See Chen Jian, *Mao’s China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, 2000).

<sup>17</sup> George C. Herring, *America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975* (Boston, 2002), 137. See also David L. Anderson, “Comments on Mark Moyar, *Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954–1965*,” *Passport: The Newsletter of SHAFR*, 38 (Dec. 2007), 13. For a view that Lyndon B. Johnson’s political credibility trumped liberalism, see Fredrik Logevall, *Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam* (Berkeley, 1999). See also Anders Stephanson, “Ideology and Neorealist Mirrors,” *Diplomatic History*, 17 (Spring 1993), 285–95.

ideology today is predicated on the losing cause of unilateral interventionism in the Third World, which, like the Soviet Union's ideals, continues "colonialism through slightly different means." The Cold War, argues Westad, was a tragedy for all concerned and had great bearing on the world's future. It was, he notes, "American ideas and their influence that made the Soviet-American conflict into a *Cold War*" in the first place.<sup>18</sup>

### America in the World

Westad's work provides a bridge from U.S. history to the realm of international history. One must be careful here, for rooting the field in international history risks losing sight of the Americanness that is the very character of U.S. diplomatic history. Some historians, such as Michael Hogan, recognize the need for understanding U.S. internal processes but encourage collaboration with scholars of international history, while Akira Iriye urges a departure from U.S.-centeredness by creating affiliations with transnational historians and scholars of world history. Both agree with Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman that American history should be holistic; we should study how American movements and institutions have connected to the wider world and, conversely, how America is influenced by the rest of the planet. Westad shows that diplomatic historians can cast their studies within a broad international framework. For instance, foreign influences have affected U.S. projects abroad. European scholars, for one, argue that non-Americans have exercised agency over U.S. policies. Those scholars question the one-way view from Washington and have issued revisionist challenges to hegemonic assumptions by showing how America's overseas audiences (both governments and people) shaped, resisted, or changed the process of Americanization. While Victoria de Grazia has illustrated the predominance of America, asserting that U.S. mass consumer culture simply overwhelmed Europe, the historiographical trend—built from a plumbing of foreign archives—has been to focus on the agency of foreigners regarding American power, even in relation to such celebrated U.S. institutions as the Marshall Plan.<sup>19</sup>

It is now unusual to find a historian of U.S. foreign relations who does *not* champion multinational, multiarchival research to understand America's influence from beyond its shores. Much impetus has come from the opening of the Soviet bloc archives, which provided new perspectives (and challenged or corroborated old ones) on the Cold War.<sup>20</sup> That said, historians will not find all areas of the world accessible to research in government holdings, as historians of the Middle East, Africa, and Southeast Asia after the 1950s know. Furthermore, access to Soviet archives has become more restricted, and, lest we forget, American scholars must often pry open their own archives.

<sup>18</sup> Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge, Eng., 2007), 396, 1–5, 8–109; See, "Ideology," 195.

<sup>19</sup> Hogan, "Next Big Thing," 13; Akira Iriye, "The Transnational Turn," *Diplomatic History*, 31 (June 2007), 375; Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman, "Diplomatic History and the Meaning of Life: Toward a Global American History," *ibid.*, 21 (Fall 1997), 500–501. Victoria de Grazia, *Irresistible Empire: America's Advance through 20th-Century Europe* (Cambridge, Mass., 2005). European revisionism refers to the ability of America's allies to shape U.S. policies. See Fraser J. Harbutt, *The Iron Curtain: Churchill, America, and the Origins of the Cold War* (New York, 1986); Richard Pells, *Not like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture since World War II* (New York, 1997); Geir Lundestad, *The United States and Western Europe since 1945: From "Empire" by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift* (New York, 2003); and Michael J. Hogan, *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947–1952* (New York, 1989).

<sup>20</sup> See, for example, Mastny, *Cold War and Soviet Insecurity*; Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge, Mass., 1997); and Lorenz M. Lüthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World* (Princeton, 2008).

Still, scholars of American foreign relations have internationalized their histories through rich state and private sources by approaching their subjects with one of two contesting realities in world history in mind. One examines the overweening imperial influence of the United States and other great powers in the international environment. The other questions American exceptionalism by emphasizing the decentered nature of global power, organization, and exchanges. Both approaches depend on multinational archival research to gain a broader perspective—one in which America is the sole protagonist—but they study different things. Usually, scholars choose America or the world. An adherent of the U.S.-first method is David Engerman, who shifts between America and Russia in his study of American intellectual constructions of the brutal course of Russian and Soviet modernization extending back into the nineteenth century. Likewise, America's hand is evident in the vicious Trujillo regime in the Dominican Republic, which was able for years to cultivate a tolerant U.S. policy toward its dictatorial cruelties; but the regime fell once the United States' "good neighbor" patience wore thin, and Washington abetted Rafael Trujillo's assassination.<sup>21</sup> American hegemony is clear in those binational studies.

The second trend in international history—that of decentering America—has more recently taken root among scholars of U.S. diplomacy. Many diplomatic historians try to privilege the foreign as much as the United States, heeding Thomas Bender's call for truly comparative and world history and for contextualizing U.S. power within the global arena. Iriye advances even further down the road of international history by turning away from the state and toward studies of broad global trends, such as investment, migration, and technology transfers. As Nathan Citino explains, that approach leads to a truly "transnational history of the United States encompassing both the unique aspects of the American experience and a global, comparative context that enriches our understanding of U.S. history."<sup>22</sup> Research on U.S. foreign relations within a world history context is in its formative, but accelerating, stages.

To see the advantages of putting the United States into an international framework, we can turn again to Westad and his work. First off, his enviable multilingualism—he knows German, Russian, English, Chinese, French—opens the door to many sources of insight into global developments. Second, that broad access engenders comparative analyses of the effects each superpower had on its Third World clients, especially the consequences of two ostensibly anticolonial endeavors (in Vietnam and Afghanistan) that often reverted to colonial rhythms. He argues that the key to understanding the course of the Cold War boils down to how the two powers played out their rivalry in the Third World. Each superpower experienced a regional quagmire from which they could not extricate themselves without fear of giving the other side an advantage. Third World nations were uncomfortable with the Soviet Union and Communist ideology, but their dire straits made them amenable to aid and radical proddings from Moscow. Yet the United States proved the more pervasive global factor; its market ideology, techno-modernization, and popular culture was much more significant than socialism in undermining traditional Third

<sup>21</sup> Marilyn B. Young, "The Age of Global Power," in *Rethinking American History in a Global Age*, ed. Thomas Bender (Berkeley, 2002), 291; David C. Engerman, *Modernization from the Other Shore: American Intellectuals and the Romance of Russian Development* (Cambridge, Mass., 2003); Eric Paul Roorda, *The Dictator Next Door: The Good Neighbor Policy and the Trujillo Regime in the Dominican Republic, 1930–1945* (Durham, 1998).

<sup>22</sup> Bender, ed., *Rethinking American History in a Global Age*; Akira Iriye, "Internationalizing International History," *ibid.* Nathan J. Citino, "The Global Frontier: Comparative History and Frontier-Borderlands Approach," in *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, ed. Hogan and Paterson, 195. See also Hogan, "Next Big Thing," 13–14.

World values and life-styles. As Westad shows, the Cold War played out in Third World countries that exercised agency over capitalism and socialism while at the same time tragically suffering under the brutal terms of the conflict.<sup>23</sup>

### Orientalism and Globalism

By expanding the geographic and conceptual parameters of the Cold War, Westad also plugs into a growing historiography derived from Edward Said's thesis of orientalism, a set of Western epistemologies about the East (including simplistic stereotypes of the globe's people of color) that justified imperialism. As Jeremi Suri notes, one group of scholars argues that American orientalism continued European imperialist paternalism before and after World War II, while another school questions the very framework of the Cold War because it mutes the agency of Third World peoples. A major contribution to the work of the first group is Mark Bradley's examination of postcolonial Vietnam, a place where imaginations and expectations did not match reality. Vietnamese and Americans encountered each other with a "shared vocabulary," but while Americans committed the orientalist sin of seeking to make over the Vietnamese in their own image, Ho Chi Minh mistakenly believed that U.S. actions were based on principles of liberation. Bradley's forays into sources at home and abroad (although many of his sources are non-governmental, he did take one of the first looks into the Vietnamese state archives) reveal that the United States was not exceptional at all; the Cold War merely disguised its post-colonial project that led from aid to occupation to war.<sup>24</sup>

The second approach, which highlights Third World agency within the orientalist construct, is represented not only by Westad, but also by others who demonstrate that nations subject to U.S. power could maneuver within their particular situation. Nick Culather explains how Filipino leaders manipulated U.S. Cold War policy to their advantage in what appears at first glance to be a textbook confirmation of U.S. hegemony. Nearly as sweeping in global scope as Westad's study is the tumultuous story told by Matthew Connelly of the Algerian struggle for independence, constructed from records from seven countries (including rebel archives), as well as an astute reading of subaltern theory. The United States is present, as is, of course, France, but the dynamic actor is the insurgent National Liberation Front, which operated within, but was not entirely bound by, Cold War constraints. Instead, Algerian liberationists capitalized on the forces of globalization, such as population shifts and emigration, communications, world opinion, and nongovernmental organizations, to divide and conquer France. Governments were critical, but diasporas were as important as departments, the media and multinational corporations as significant as the military. Connelly pointedly veers away from "the interminable fights

<sup>23</sup> Westad, *Global Cold War*, 192, 155–57, 397–98, 407; O. A. Westad, "Devices and Desires: On the Uses of Cold War History," *Cold War History*, 6 (Aug. 2006), 374. For state- or American-centered studies, see Kathryn C. Statler and Andrew L. Johns, *The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War* (Lanham, 2006). For non-American perspectives, see Hal Brands, "Third World Politics in an Age of Global Turmoil: The Latin American Challenge to U.S. and Western Hegemony, 1965–1975," *Diplomatic History*, 32 (Jan. 2008), 105–38.

<sup>24</sup> For the application of the term orientalism in one region, see Douglas Little, *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945* (Chapel Hill, 2008). Jeremi Suri, "The Cold War, Decolonization, and Global Social Awakenings: Historical Intersections," *Cold War History*, 6 (Aug. 2006), 354. For a study that examines an advanced nation of color, rather than the usual Third World country, see Naoko Shibusawa, *America's Geisha Ally: Reimagining the Japanese Enemy* (Cambridge, Mass., 2006). Mark P. Bradley, *Imagining Vietnam and America: The Making of Postcolonial Vietnam, 1919–1950* (Chapel Hill, 2000), 6.

between State Department bureaucrats,” preferring the interactions of the domestic political economy and culture and world systems of “structures, or nongovernmental phenomena that have changed the basis of interstate relations.”<sup>25</sup> In doing so, he has transformed the historiography by writing history from the bottom up and across international lines.

Other historians give non-American or nongovernmental actors their due in globalized versions of U.S. diplomatic history. Suri’s *Power and Protest* engages the world through a reading of U.S., European, and Chinese sources, yielding insights into the cause and effect of empires and war. He finds that a chain reaction of 1960s protests prompted the superpowers into mutually easing tensions; détente, he contends, was designed as much to calm domestic audiences as to resolve Cold War issues. Having gained access to Cuban records, Piero Gleijeses crafted an international history of mid-twentieth century struggles in Africa. In Gleijeses’s account, Fidel Castro, rather than the United States or the Soviet Union, is the protagonist. The superpowers had little interest in Africa, and U.S. players appear mainly in the section on Henry Kissinger’s failed covert action in Angola.<sup>26</sup> Like other works, Gleijeses’s helps dismantle orientalist assumptions of Western superiority by highlighting the agency of Third World nations.

Diplomatic historians also analyze how orientalism created a distinct world view that steered white elites toward foreign policies infused with U.S. domestic racial ideologies. Like women, the nonwhite peoples of the world were perceived as irrational and unreliable, tying race and gender to a dismissal of foreign nonwhite cultures that occupied the bottom rungs of the global power hierarchy. For instance, Paul Kramer’s exploration of the U.S.-Philippines relationship shows how racial policies of colonialism were absorbed back into American ideology through displays of international culture exhibitions at home and then had a deleterious impact on Asian immigration policy.<sup>27</sup>

Other diplomatic historians also using an orientalist framework have begun producing a wave of studies on America in the pre-Cold War world. For instance, Erez Manela tells the story of the 1919 Paris Peace Conference from the outside in through the viewpoint of Egyptians, Indians, Chinese, and Koreans. He analyzes the “Wilsonian moment”—when the vision of self-determination seemed possible—from the perspective of the weak who were excluded from the meeting halls. Exploring a neglected topic of the American Civil War, Jay Sexton argues that a transnational, transatlantic network of financial firms gave London, as well as Wall Street, leverage over Confederate and Union diplomacy. And in an interpretation conducive to world history, Andrew Rotter internationalizes the atomic bombing of Hiroshima by explaining not only how a global group of scientists developed the weapon under the supervision of the Americans, but how the whole world then had to live with the consequences.<sup>28</sup>

It is likely that diplomatic historians will increase their forays into the pre-World War II era to make global connections, but the Cold War remains the main focus in interna-

<sup>25</sup> Connelly, *Diplomatic Revolution*, viii–ix. See also Nick Cullather, *Illusions of Influence: The Political Economy of United States–Philippines Relations, 1942–1960* (Stanford, 1995); and Hogan, “Next Big Thing,” 16.

<sup>26</sup> Jeremi Suri, *Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente* (Cambridge, Mass., 2003); Piero Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976* (Chapel Hill, 2002).

<sup>27</sup> Kramer, *Blood of Government*, 6–7, 229–84. For elite racial constructions, see Renda, *Taking Haiti*, 109–30; Joseph M. Henning, *Outposts of Civilization: Race, Religion, and the Formative Years of American–Japanese Relations* (New York, 2000); and Gordon H. Chang, “Whose ‘Barbarism’? Whose ‘Treachery’? Race and Civilization in the Unknown United States–Korea War of 1871,” *Journal of American History*, 89 (March 2003), 1331–65.

<sup>28</sup> Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (Oxford, 2007), 6; Jay Sexton, *Debtor Diplomacy: Finance and American Foreign Relations in the Civil War Era, 1837–1873* (Oxford, 2005); Andrew J. Rotter, *Hiroshima: The World’s Bomb* (New York, 2008).

tional history, and the persistent priority is understanding state-to-state relations. Within the scope of transatlantic relations between the United States and its European allies, Mark Lawrence explains the U.S. commitment to Vietnam, and Fredrik Logevall places Lyndon Johnson's escalation of the war within the dimension of international politics. Thomas Schwartz refocuses on the presidency in *Lyndon Johnson and Europe* and shifts the setting from Washington to European cities as he traces the tortured history of the Allies' discomfort with the Vietnam War, emphasizing that the war did not matter in those relations as much as historians have claimed. A back-and-forth between capitals also characterizes Salim Yaqub's study of the Eisenhower Doctrine and Peter Hahn's analysis of Arab-Israeli relations. For both of those works, the authors searched previously classified documents in the Middle East, Europe, and America to show that the hidden purpose behind combating Communism was the containment of radical Arabs and placating domestic interests. Max Paul Friedman also casts a wide net in his study of the U.S. hunt for Nazis in Latin America during World War II, which he uncovers through research in seven countries, spanning three continents. The American state also interacts at the highest levels in the diplomatic international arena in Kenton Clymer's multiarchival study of American-Cambodian relations, and in Yafeng Xia's comparative history of the negotiating pressures and approaches in, as well as the effects of Sino-American relations. Other scholars place U.S.-China exchanges in a global perspective. None of these accounts could have revealed the tangled strands of agency and power had they not set their stories in an international or regional context and drawn on multinational research and new documents so important to the field's existence.<sup>29</sup>

The mix of nonstate and public actors on the international stage also provides opportunities for innovations in the field. Nick Cullather addresses the foreign policy of the calorie, for example, showing that the way Americans set the standards for counting this unit of measurement transformed diplomacy just as it changed diets. The calorie "popularized and factualized a set of assumptions that allowed Americans to see food as an instrument of power and to envisage a 'world food problem' amenable to political and scientific intervention" by philanthropic and international governmental organizations; military planning and occupation authorities; and makers of U.S. export policies.<sup>30</sup> Considering the interplay of ideology and global sports, Barbara Keys examines national and international organization archives in America, Russia, Switzerland, and Germany to reveal the

<sup>29</sup> Lawrence, *Assuming the Burden*. For a more global perspective, see Mark Atwood Lawrence, *The Vietnam War: A Concise International History* (New York, 2008). Logevall, *Choosing War*. For a seven-nation view of another conflict, see William Stueck, *The Korean War: An International History* (Princeton, 1997). Thomas Alan Schwartz, *Lyndon Johnson and Europe: In the Shadow of Vietnam* (Cambridge, Mass., 2003); Salim Yaqub, *Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East* (Chapel Hill, 2006); Peter L. Hahn, *Caught in the Middle East: U.S. Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1945–1961* (Chapel Hill, 2006); Max Paul Friedman, *Nazis and Good Neighbors: The United States Campaign against the Germans of Latin America in World War II* (Cambridge, Eng., 2003); Kenton Clymer, *The United States and Cambodia, 1969–2000: A Troubled Relationship* (London, 2004); Yafeng Xia, *Negotiating with the Enemy: U.S.-China Talks during the Cold War, 1949–1972* (Bloomington, 2006). For a global context, see Julian Go and Anne L. Foster, eds., *The American Colonial State in the Philippines: Global Perspectives* (Durham, 2003). In accessing declassified documents, historians have benefited from the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, *Cold War International History Project*, [http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=topics.home&topic\\_id=1409](http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=topics.home&topic_id=1409); George Washington University, *National Security Archive*, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchive/>; and the Digital National Security Archive, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/marketing/index.jsp>.

<sup>30</sup> Nick Cullather, "The Foreign Policy of the Calorie," *American Historical Review*, 112 (April 2007), 339. On American transnationals within an international system (in this case, the legal regime of extraterritoriality), see Eileen P. Scully, *Bargaining with the State from Afar: American Citizenship in Treaty Port China, 1844–1942* (New York, 2001).

synergic tension between nationalism and cultural integration in Olympic, boxing, and World Cup soccer competitions in the 1930s. She generates conclusions about the role of sports as means for governments to trumpet their virtues and as a nexus of state power and ideology within transnational arenas. International history is also being written by teams of scholars, obviating the need for one person to master several languages. For instance, a collection of essays edited by Marc Gallicchio on the Asia-Pacific War from the standpoint of the Chinese, Japanese, and Americans draws on the work of four American and five Asian scholars to “gain a better appreciation for the variety of forms that . . . memories can take.”<sup>31</sup>

### Identity’s Twists and Turns

As that group effort implies, although many diplomatic historians are tackling the internationalizing reforms so valuable to the profession at large, many of them do not have the language tools to set their work in a truly global framework. Besides, while scholars may agree with the pioneering Akira Iriye that the joining of international history with studies of cultural relations is an exciting endeavor, some have maintained a focus on home front culture and its impact abroad; the U.S. government’s cultural diplomatic initiatives; and binational cultural contacts. Paul Kramer, in his study of race and empire during the four decades of U.S. occupation of the Philippines, focuses on all three by weaving official and transnational contacts into a narrative of colonialism and national identities centered on race. Yet one of his key points is that the occupation recast American racial relationships as much as U.S. foreign policy. Many other historians of U.S. foreign relations stick a toe into the waters of global history without losing their Americanist focus. For example, Aims McGuinness takes an old topic—the California gold rush—and combines the transnational migration of Americans with the building of a transcontinental railroad through Panama, all in the context of U.S. imperial designs and Latin American efforts to resist them. Melani McAlister grounds her study of how the United States framed its interests in the Middle East within a context of religious beliefs, media treatment, and popular culture. Thus, while Iriye succinctly defines culture, when it comes to international affairs, as “the sharing and transmitting of consciousness within and across national boundaries,” it is important to note that many diplomatic historians, like most other historians of the United States, have not taken a huge transnational leap, thrown off the state or, for that matter, shifted their perspective from the United States itself. In fact, one of the most dynamic areas of study involves turning *inward* to characterize how the nation’s cultural features played out in an international context.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>31</sup> Barbara J. Keys, *Globalizing Sport: National Rivalry and International Community in the 1930s* (Cambridge, Mass., 2006), 4–13. See also Sayuri Guthrie-Shimizu, “For Love of the Game: Baseball in Early U.S.-Japan Encounters and the Rise of a Transnational Sporting Fraternity,” *Diplomatic History*, 28 (Nov. 2004), 637–62. Marc Gallicchio, ed., *The Unpredictability of the Past: Memories of the Asia-Pacific War in U.S.–East Asian Relations* (Durham, 2007), 11. For other team efforts, see James C. Cobb and William Stueck, eds., *Globalization and the American South* (Athens, Ga., 2005); William C. Kirby, Robert S. Ross, and Gong Li, *Normalization of U.S.-China Relations: An International History* (Cambridge, Mass., 2005); Andreas W. Daum, Lloyd C. Gardner, and Wilfried Mausbach, eds., *America, the Vietnam War, and the World: Comparative and International Perspectives* (Cambridge, Eng., 2003); and Alan McPherson, ed., *Anti-Americanism in Latin America and the Caribbean* (New York, 2006). See also “AHR Forum: Historical Perspectives on Anti-Americanism,” *American Historical Review*, 111 (Oct. 2006), 1041–49.

<sup>32</sup> Iriye, “Internationalizing International History,” 57. Akira Iriye, “Culture and International History,” in *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, ed. Hogan and Paterson, 242. On official cultural diplomacy, see S. E. Graham, “The (Real)politik of Culture: U.S. Cultural Diplomacy in Unesco, 1946–1954,” *Diplomatic History*, 30 (April 2006), 231–51. For binational studies, see T. Christopher Jespersen, *American Images of China*,

That is, like historians of American culture, diplomatic historians seek to define what it is to be American, arguing for the importance of that identity in the making of U.S. foreign policy. Diplomatic historians determine identity by drawing on language, race, gender, class, the arts, media, ideology, and a host of other influences that give agency to previously neglected actors and organizations.<sup>33</sup> Thus, diplomatic historians have made innovative headway in linking the study of foreign relations to mainstream cultural history within the historical profession.

At one level, culture is conceived in a quite literal sense: scholars of U.S. foreign relations examine official cultural institutions and study local life to explain the roots and nature of U.S. power abroad. That research agenda is not new, but it has compelled diplomatic historians to weigh culture as an element in foreign policy making. Diplomatic historians explore such topics as government and transnational cultural relations with particular countries and regions; the extension of philanthropic efforts; tourism and travel; educational exchanges; the role of the press, radio, film, propaganda, and other media outlets; the influence of U.S. religious groups and ideas; and conservation treaties and other environmental concerns.<sup>34</sup> The work of Walter Hixson and Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman demonstrates how official tools such as propaganda and the Peace Corps were critical elements of America's Cold War arsenal. Investigations into elements of culture also led to revelations by Kenneth Osgood regarding the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration's secret motivation for winning hearts and minds at home and abroad through psychological warfare. Analysis of Eisenhower's Atoms For Peace program and cultural and educational exchanges, for instance, uncovers a campaign for public opinion and also confirms that Ike was no disinterested figure in decision making.<sup>35</sup> Studies on the overseas reception of

1931–1949 (Stanford, 1996); Simei Qing, *From Allies to Enemies: Visions of Modernity, Identity, and U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1945–1960* (Cambridge, Mass., 2007); Yukiko Koshiro, *Trans-Pacific Racisms and the U.S. Occupation of Japan* (New York, 1999); and Reinhold Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria after the Second World War* (Chapel Hill, 1994). See also Kramer, *Blood of Government*; Aims McGuinness, *Path of Empire: Panama and the California Gold Rush* (Ithaca, 2007); and Melani McAlister, *Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interests in the Middle East since 1945* (Berkeley, 2005).

<sup>33</sup> For example, see Gretchen Murphy, *Hemispheric Imaginings: The Monroe Doctrine and Narratives of U.S. Empire* (Durham, 2005).

<sup>34</sup> For early works on foreign policy and culture, see Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream*; and Frank Costigliola, *Awkward Dominion: American Political, Economic, and Cultural Relations with Europe, 1919–1933* (Ithaca, 1984). On transnational and governmental interaction, see James Goode, *Negotiating for the Past: Archaeology, Nationalism, and Diplomacy in the Middle East, 1919–1941* (Austin, 2007). On philanthropy, see Volker Berghahn, "Philanthropy and Diplomacy in the 'American Century,'" *Diplomatic History*, 23 (Summer 1999), 393–419. Travel is discussed in Christopher Endy, *Cold War Holidays: American Tourism in France* (Chapel Hill, 2004); and Neal Moses Rosendorf, "Be El Caudillo's Guest: The Franco Regime's Quest for Rehabilitation and Dollars after World War II via the Promotion of U.S. Tourism in Spain," *Diplomatic History*, 30 (June 2006), 367–407. On education, see Whitney Walton, "Internationalism and the Junior Year Abroad: American Students in France in the 1920s and 1930s," *ibid.*, 29 (April 2005), 255–78. On media, see Daniel S. Margolies, *Henry Waterson and the New South: The Politics of Empire, Free Trade, and Globalization* (Lexington, Ky., 2006); and Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible: American Journalism as Cultural Diplomacy in Postwar Germany, 1945–1955* (Baton Rouge, 1999). On film, see Brian C. Etheridge, "The Desert Fox, Memory Diplomacy, and the German Question in Early Cold War America," *Diplomatic History*, 32 (April 2008), 207–38. On religion, see Seth Jacobs, *America's Miracle Man in Vietnam: Ngo Dinh Diem, Religion, Race, and U.S. Intervention in Southeast Asia, 1950–1957* (Durham, 2004); Andrew Preston, "Bridging the Gap between the Sacred and the Secular in the History of American Foreign Relations," *Diplomatic History*, 30 (Nov. 2006), 783–812; George J. Hill, "Intimate Relationships: Secret Affairs of Church and State in the United States and Liberia, 1925–1947," *ibid.*, 31 (June 2007), 465–503; and David S. Foglesong, *The American Mission and the "Evil Empire": The Crusade for a "Free Russia" since 1881* (Cambridge, Eng., 2007). On environmental diplomacy, see Kurkpatrick Dorsey, *The Dawn of Conservation Diplomacy: U.S.-Canadian Wildlife Protection Treaties in the Progressive Era* (Seattle, 1998); Kurk Dorsey, "Dealing with the Dinosaur (and Its Swamp): Putting the Environment in Diplomatic History," *ibid.*, 29 (Sept. 2005), 573–87; and Kurk Dorsey and Mark Lytle, "Forum on Environmental History and International History," *Diplomatic History*, 32 (Sept. 2008).

<sup>35</sup> Walter L. Hixson, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945–1961* (New York, 1997);

these tools of persuasion are multiplying, while others are reversing the direction of international history by studying the impact of foreign cultures on the U.S. domestic front and arguing that an understanding of globalization depends on recognizing that cultural imports as well as exports have altered our consumer culture. In a further effort to turn traditional notions on their head, several historians have gauged the effects of the Cold War on average people in the United States and abroad by probing the local impact of U.S. national security policies.<sup>36</sup>

## Gender Construction

Joining identity and U.S. foreign relations reflects approaches familiar to historians, and ones that scholars of foreign policy history have proven adept at brandishing. For instance, when U.S. diplomatic historians study gender and foreign relations, they turn as much, if not more, to theory and discourse than to actual women in history. Of course, women have been present in diplomacy, as missionaries, peace activists, spousal advisors, and witnesses to history, and even as policy makers, but at both elite and non-elite echelons they are scarcer than in many other fields. Using gender as an ideological building block has much potential, in its power to expose, as Laura McEnaney writes, the “dynamic interrelationship between the creation of foreign policy and the construction of gender.” Reading beyond the usual bureaucratic minutiae of the documentary records, argues Andrew Rotter, brings to the center of inquiry what many considered diplomatic marginalia regarding gendered feelings and behavior. Thus, the presumed sentimentality of Indian leaders, lecherousness of the Spanish in Cuba in the 1890s, and enfeebled nature of the Chinese at the turn of the twentieth century highlighted gendered perceptions of diplomats. That approach is not without its critics among diplomatic historians; some are troubled that such constructions force gender into the geopolitical box of foreign policy even when evidence is not present that groups were identified in gendered ways. Nevertheless, others have heeded Joan Scott’s counsel to conceptualize “the subject of war, diplomacy, and high politics” within the category of gender, “one of the recurrent references by which political power has been conceived, legitimized, and criticized.”<sup>37</sup>

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Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman, *All You Need Is Love: The Peace Corps and the Spirit of the 1960s* (Cambridge, Mass., 1998); Kenneth A. Osgood, *Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad* (Lawrence, 2006); See also Michael Krenn, *Fall-Out Shelters for the Human Spirit: American Art and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, 2005); Helen Laville and Hugh Wilford, eds., *The U.S. Government, Citizens Groups, and the Cold War: The State-Private Network* (New York, 2006); and John Trumbour, *Selling Hollywood to the World: U.S. and European Struggle for Mastery of the Global Film Industry, 1920–1950* (New York, 2002).

<sup>36</sup> Marc Frey, “Tools of Empire: Persuasion and the United States’s Modernizing Mission in Southeast Asia,” *Diplomatic History*, 27 (Sept. 2003), 543–68; Kristin Hoganson, *Consumer’s Imperium: The Global Production of American Domesticity, 1865–1920* (Chapel Hill, 2007); Jeffrey A. Engel, ed., *Local Consequences of the Global Cold War* (Washington, 2007). For another example of a top-down microhistory, see Mark P. Bradley and Marilyn B. Young, eds., *Making Sense of the Vietnam Wars: Local, National, and Transnational Perspectives* (New York, 2008).

<sup>37</sup> Laura McEnaney, “Gender,” in *Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy*, ed. DeConde, Burns, and Logevall, 124. See also Emily S. Rosenberg, “Gender,” *Journal of American History*, 77 (June 1990), 119. For women in diplomacy, see Edward P. Crapol, ed., *Women and American Foreign Policy: Lobbyists, Critics, and Insiders* (Wilmington, 1992); Carol C. Chin, “Beneficent Imperialists: American Women Missionaries in China at the Turn of the Century,” *Diplomatic History*, 27 (June 2003), 327–52; Catherine Forslund, *Anna Chennault: Informal Diplomacy and Asian Relations* (Wilmington, 2002); and Molly M. Wood, “‘Commanding Beauty’ and ‘Gentle Charm’: American Women and Gender in the Early Twentieth-Century Foreign Service,” *Diplomatic History*, 31 (June 2007), 505–30. Andrew J. Rotter, “Gender Relations, Foreign Relations: The United States and South Asia, 1947–1964,” *Journal of American History*, 81 (Sept. 1994), 522, 542. For opposition to Andrew Rotter’s argument, see Melvyn P. Leffler, “New Approaches, Old Interpretations, and Prospective Reconfigurations,” *Diplomatic History*, 19 (Spring 1995), 182–83. Joan W. Scott, “Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis,” *American Historical Review*, 91 (Dec.

Frank Costigliola, for one, has pushed the field toward a postmodern theory that exposes deep meanings in language, both written and spoken. Such an exercise helps interpret how diplomatic rhetoric was laden with emotions that expressed underlying intent. The language of diplomats and other elite foreign policy makers, in other words, was not value free but full of figures of speech. At times, such tropes rationalized a tough, paternalistic stance toward supposedly crazed or bullying enemies, and they could also feminize allies. Costigliola discerns tropes of gender at the highest reaches of politics. Thus, George Kennan described the Soviets in terms suggesting hypermasculine, psychopathic rapists, beyond the pale of reason, and bent on penetrating the vulnerable American-dependent “family” of Western Europe. Such language helped channel discussion among U.S. policy makers, encouraging them to confront, rather than seek compromise with, the Soviet Union. Kennan and other self-described realists won the day, in part, by framing their arguments in emotional language that reflected pervasive notions about the connections between robust masculinity and anticommunism.<sup>38</sup>

Kristin Hoganson also substantiates the arguments that foreign policy is steeped in U.S. culture and that gender has a distinctly causative role. In *Fighting for American Manhood* she looks inward, to the domestic sources of foreign policy and infuses notions of manliness into a well-trodden question: Why did the United States go to war against Spain in 1898? Hoganson finds the answer in perceptions of a bourgeois flaccidity that had come to plague the country due to the closing of the frontier, the domestication of men, and the supposedly emasculating political activism of women. War would reposition men at the top of society’s hierarchical ladder and restore the presumably essential manly character of U.S. democracy.<sup>39</sup> Gender, then, linked directly to state policies.

Other works apply gendered identity to such geopolitical interests as war, empire, and threat perception. Emily Rosenberg’s gendered reading of dollar diplomacy in the first three decades of the twentieth century reveals that bankers who extended loans abroad were hardly impartial imperial actors. They operated within a cultural milieu in which professionalism derived from the masculine virtues of scientific organization and self-control and from a duty to protect the supposedly frail, indulgent elements of U.S. society and the irrational foreigners who were the targets of the bankers’ civilizing mission. A host of additional topics similarly make gender connections. The transformation of Japan from a wartime beast into a submissive Cold War pupil in the hands of a mature, dominating U.S. occupation authority is an example. Petra Goedde studies how the fraternization between American soldiers and Germans transformed the latter from Nazis to victims, explaining in part how the United States accepted its former enemy into the Western alliance. Israeli manliness in the face of Arab irrationality and India’s feminized, weak-willed neutrality in the Cold War emerged in the gendered perceptions of top policy makers. Camelot, too, is ripe for gender analysis. The John F. Kennedy admin-

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1986), 1073.

<sup>38</sup> Frank Costigliola, “Reading for Meaning: Theory, Language, and Metaphor,” in *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, ed. Hogan and Paterson, 280–84, 291–300; Frank Costigliola, “‘Like Animals or Worse’: Narratives of Culture and Emotion by U.S. and British POWs and Airmen behind Soviet Lines, 1944–1945,” *Diplomatic History*, 28 (Nov. 2004), 749–80; McEnaney, “Gender,” 130–32; Frank Costigliola, “Unceasing Pressure for Penetration: Gender, Pathology, and Emotion in George Kennan’s Formation of the Cold War,” *Journal of American History*, 83 (March 1997), 1309–11, 1313, 1316–17, 1323, 1328, 1330, 1332–38; Frank Costigliola, “The Nuclear Family: Tropes of Gender and Pathology in the Western Alliance,” *Diplomatic History*, 21 (Spring 1997), 163–83.

<sup>39</sup> Kristin L. Hoganson, *Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars* (New Haven, 1998); McEnaney, “Gender,” 131.

istration's testosterone-charged adoption of an "ideology of masculinity," argues Robert Dean, countered perceived impotence abroad and a declining democratic resolve at home caused by decadent U.S. consumer habits. Works that examine feelings and masculinity in diplomatic history have given us more complex views of identity. Furthermore, gender studies has linked the domestic to the international, indicating ways that gender is integral to the making of diplomatic culture at home and, ultimately, to the creation of policies by government leaders.<sup>40</sup>

## Racial Identities

Like gender, racial constructs have also become integral to the cultural turn in diplomatic history. As Rosenberg explains, "racial thought and imagery can hardly be teased away from tropes about gender because, in mass culture, representations of manhood tended to be colored white and clothed as American." Indeed, many authors (including those with a foot in the international history camp) integrate more than one category of analysis—race, gender, and class—into their concerns with state power and power hierarchies.<sup>41</sup> It should be noted that an outpouring of literature considers how white elites resisted or compromised the championing of equal rights in Africa and elsewhere, but another closely related and equally dynamic branch of the historiography of race and foreign policy deals with black agency. The juxtaposition of African Americans, foreign policy, and international events addresses racial ideology and race relations at home. Scholarship on race, as Gerald Horne notes, is heavily weighted toward the African American experience (and on the mid-twentieth century), which is not surprising given that the treatment of African Americans has been a thorn in the side of the nation's domestic and foreign agendas.<sup>42</sup>

<sup>40</sup> Emily S. Rosenberg, *Financial Missionaries to the World: The Politics and Culture of Dollar Diplomacy, 1900–1930* (Durham, 2003), 33; Shibusawa, *America's Geisha Ally*; Petra Goedde, *Gis and Germans: Culture, Gender, and Foreign Relations, 1945–1949* (New Haven, 2003); Michelle Mart, *Eye on Israel: How America Came to View Israel as an Ally* (Albany, 2006); Andrew J. Rotter, *Comrades at Odds: The United States and India, 1947–1964* (Ithaca, 2000), 188–219; Robert D. Dean, *Imperial Brotherhood: Gender and the Making of Cold War Foreign Policy* (Amherst, 2002). See also Eric Paul Roorda, "McCarthyite in Camelot: The 'Loss' of Cuba, Homophobia, and the Otto Otepka Scandal in the Kennedy State Department," *Diplomatic History*, 31 (Sept. 2007), 723–54; and Kristin Hoganson, "What's Gender Got to Do with It? Gender History as Foreign Relations History" in *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, ed. Hogan and Paterson, 308, 316, 322.

<sup>41</sup> Rosenberg, *Financial Missionaries to the World*, 208. For other works that make the gender-race connection, see Mary Ann Heiss, *Empire and Nationhood: The United States, Great Britain, and Iranian Oil, 1950–1954* (New York, 1997); and Stephen G. Rabe, *U.S. Intervention in British Guiana: A Cold War Story* (Chapel Hill, 2005), 182–84. For two studies that adopt more than one category of analysis (race and gender), see Shibusawa, *America's Geisha Ally*; and Renda, *Taking Haiti*. The study of ethnic affiliation and immigration has long drawn interest. See John Snetsinger, "Race and Ethnicity," in *Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy*, ed. DeConde, Burns, and Logevall, 289–308; and Alexander DeConde, *Ethnicity, Race, and American Foreign Policy: A History* (Boston, 1992). Interest in class issues does not match that in race and gender, but scholars have successfully tied labor to diplomacy. See Elizabeth McKillen, *Chicago Labor and the Quest for a Democratic Diplomacy, 1914–1924* (Ithaca, 1995); Jon V. Kofas, "U.S. Foreign Policy and the World Federation of Trade Unions, 1944–1948," *Diplomatic History*, 26 (Winter 2002), 21–60; Andrew Battista, "Unions and Cold War Foreign Policy in the 1980s: The National Labor Committee, the AFL-CIO, and Central America," *ibid.*, 26 (Summer 2002), 419–51; and Edmund F. Wehrle, *Between a River and a Mountain: The AFL-CIO and the Vietnam War* (Ann Arbor, 2005).

<sup>42</sup> See Andrew DeRoche, *Black, White, and Chrome: The United States and Zimbabwe, 1953–1998* (Trenton, 2001); Mary L. Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy* (Princeton, 2002); Thomas Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena* (Cambridge, Mass., 2003); Robert Rook, "Race, Water, and Foreign Policy: The Tennessee Valley Authority's Global Agenda Meets 'Jim Crow,'" *Diplomatic History*, 28 (Jan. 2004), 55–81; Penny M. Von Eschen, *Sachmo Blows Up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War* (Cambridge, Mass., 2004); Matthew Jones, "A 'Segregated' Asia? Race, the Bandung Conference, and Pan-Asianist Fears in American Thought and Policy, 1954–1955," *Diplomatic History*, 29

Among others, Horne argues that African Americans, though long an oppositional group to the foreign policy establishment, used the powerful tool of moral suasion as leverage against white elites who ran the government. Brenda Gayle Plummer's sweeping coverage of the 1935–1960 period and Jonathan Rosenberg's even longer chronological exploration point to some of the rich veins that have been mined to dispel stereotypes about black involvement in foreign affairs. Not only were African Americans well organized and knowledgeable regarding foreign policy, but they articulated positions that shaped elite dialogue. African Americans gained greater awareness of global issues through black churches, the press, and other institutions, giving them access to the national dialogue and not only on issues dealing with Africa. They usually voiced a liberal internationalist public opinion, but they resisted the white establishment on issues that directly addressed the black community, such as the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 or early Cold War–era foot-dragging on human rights. By the time of the *Brown v. Board of Education* decision, African American lobbying on international policies, like their identity as internationalists and civil rights activists, focused the nation itself on the issue of race.<sup>43</sup>

World War II was a catalytic moment, especially for African Americans. As Justin Hart notes, rather than searching the Cold War for the roots of postwar racial transformations, we should look to World War II, and specifically the government's desire to strengthen ties with Latin America by curbing discrimination, to see the first steps toward white America's embrace of civil rights.<sup>44</sup> Well known is the "Double V" campaign, the wartime effort for African American civil rights, but historians of U.S. foreign relations are beginning to fill in the gaps in the important story of black pressure to bring race to the fore in diplomacy and policy making. It is a largely depressing tale of power, geopolitics, and racism defeating righteousness, yet the African American campaign for civil rights through involvement in foreign policy is also a dramatic narrative that reveals the twists and turns of shifting black identity.

Diplomatic historians greatly add to an understanding of the tortured march toward civil rights and identity politics. Marc Gallicchio explores archives on both sides of the Pacific Ocean to show how African Americans joined their domestic struggle with the quest for freedom from imperialism by people of color in Africa and India. Placing their

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(Nov. 2005), 841–68; J. P. Brits, "Tiptoeing along the Apartheid Tightrope: The United States, South Africa, and the United Nations in 1952," *International History Review*, 27 (Dec. 2005), 754–79; George White Jr., *Holding the Line: Race, Racism, and American Foreign Policy toward Africa, 1953–1961* (Lanham, 2005); and Michael L. Krenn, *The Color of Empire: Race and American Foreign Relations* (Dulles, 2006). On pre–Cold War racism, see Tim Matthewson, *A Proslavery Foreign Policy: Haitian-American Relations during the Early Republic* (Westport, 2003); and Eric T. L. Love, *Race over Empire: Racism and U.S. Imperialism, 1865–1900* (Chapel Hill, 2004). On transnational forces of racism, see Jason M. Colby, "'Banana Growing and Negro Management': Race, Labor, and Jim Crow Colonialism in Guatemala, 1884–1930," *Diplomatic History*, 30 (Sept. 2006), 595–621. Gerald Horne, "Race to Insight: The United States and the World, White Supremacy and Foreign Affairs," in *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, ed. Hogan and Paterson, 323–25.

<sup>43</sup> Horne, "Race to Insight," 334. For example, blacks levered the British need for ships in 1940 to promote U.S.-led decolonization in Jamaica. See Jason Parker, *Brother's Keeper: The United States, Race, and Empire in the British Caribbean, 1937–1962* (New York, 2008); Brenda Gayle Plummer, *Rising Wind: Black Americans and U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1935–1960* (Chapel Hill, 1996), 4–5, 22–36; and Jonathan Rosenberg, *How Far the Promised Land? World Affairs and the American Civil Rights Movement from the First World War to Vietnam* (Princeton, 2005). Martin Luther King Jr., for one, drew on inspiration from black Africans abroad to press for equality at home. See James H. Meriwether, *Proudly We Can Be Africans: Black Americans and Africa, 1935–1961* (Chapel Hill, 2002). *Brown v. Board of Education*, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

<sup>44</sup> Justin Hart, "Making Democracy Safe for the World: Race, Propaganda, and the Transformation of U.S. Foreign Policy during World War II," *Pacific Historical Review*, 73 (Feb. 2004), 49–84.

bets on two losing horses—imperial Japan and chaotic China—American black intellectuals, journalists, radicals, and civil rights activists found themselves bereft of meaningful global allies after the war. Faced with a conservative backlash at home, those internationalists joined with the moribund left wing of the Democratic party. In doing so, Carol Anderson asserts, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People bet wrong again, this time on a United Nations human rights campaign as a way to gain political and economic rights. Southern whites and cold warriors would have none of that, forcing activists to retreat to the narrower crusade for civil rights without the broad base of the United Nations behind them. Like Penny Von Eschen, Anderson and Gallicchio acknowledge that the Cold War was a tremendous setback to civil rights. The conflict severed the links between international and domestic politics, and Von Eschen argues that the defeat of the Left precipitated a total defeat for African Americans—although Anderson and Gallicchio believe African American victory was never likely anyway. African Americans thus began focusing only on the home front crusade, in which victory finally arrived two decades later. Cold War liberalism trumped anticolonialism and equal rights, but black elites had, nonetheless, piqued awareness among the black population of foreign affairs issues beyond Africa and slavery. As Gallicchio concludes, activists created a “global consciousness” that furthered the cause of decolonization which, in turn, affected the civil rights crusade—and domestic consciousness—in the 1960s.<sup>45</sup>

Black identity and the struggle for civil rights was shaped not only by struggle abroad, but also by injustices at home, which then resonated in the international arena. Scholars of U.S. foreign relations have pioneered the effort to link cultures from across the world by their race-based campaigns for freedom, further defining the cultural identity of African Americans. They have also made clear that the story was as much about government responses and struggles for power as it was about justice for minorities. More research by U.S. diplomatic historians on this racial group, as well as on the contributions of other minorities in the fight against discrimination, is in the offing. Suffice it to say that, at the very least, anecdotal evidence reveals that the study of cultural diplomacy through topics such as race and gender attracts a greater share of graduate students and scholars of U.S. foreign relations than ever before.<sup>46</sup>

### Ideology, the International, and Identity: Defining the Field through the State

Clearly, histories of U.S. foreign relations have moved beyond established categories and stereotyped pigeonholes and defy characterization as merely diplomatic history. That said, the transformation has been one of degree rather than kind. While the methodological renaissance has expanded the playing field of approaches, actors, topics, and interactions, the study of U.S. foreign relations remains recognizable, with its power- and policy-oriented focus. Devotion to national security policies is prevalent; government archives maintain their hold on scholars, as evidenced by the widespread awareness of the frustratingly labored declassification procedures in the federal bureaucracy; and the

<sup>45</sup> Marc Gallicchio, *The African American Encounter with Japan and China: Black Internationalism in Asia, 1895–1945* (Chapel Hill, 2000), 212; Carol Anderson, *Eyes off the Prize: The United Nations and the African American Struggle for Human Rights, 1944–1955* (New York, 2003); Penny M. Von Eschen, *Race against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937–1957* (Ithaca, 1997), 186–87.

<sup>46</sup> Mary L. Dudziak, *Exporting American Dreams: Thurgood Marshall's African Journey* (New York, 2008); Cary Fraser, “Crossing the Color Line in Little Rock: The Eisenhower Administration and the Dilemma of Race for U.S. Foreign Policy,” *Diplomatic History*, 24 (Spring 2000), 233–64.

State Department's compilation of documents in the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series, around since the time of Abraham Lincoln, remains one of the most accessible sources, and a foundation of research and teaching, for diplomatic historians.<sup>47</sup> Thus, scholars of U.S. foreign relations negotiate the boundaries between ideas, global history, and culture while preserving their core mission of studying state-oriented diplomacy.

That approach is logical, not only because diplomatic historians are very good at elevating the state in their stories, but also because maintaining the state in American history is essential to good research. In short, the tools of research are abundant, the sources accessible, and the methodologies evolving for diplomatic historians to engage the larger profession in the importance of the state, while moving the field toward the majority's embrace of ideas, the international, and identity. The future shape of the field is now the question: How far down the path of transnationalism do historians of American foreign relations wish to go without abandoning the state? Is scholarship so amalgamated that it makes differentiating between the United States' internal and external history—between the foreign and domestic—impossible? When internationalizing their research, historians of the United States must remain cognizant of the state as they stay wedded to the forces of society and culture. Doing so will provide a more complete understanding of American history itself.

Admittedly, this reconceptualization of the field has led to an uncertainty as to what truly constitutes diplomatic history. This is a healthy perplexity, however, based less on tossing aside old techniques and topics and more on an intellectual commotion of originating, configuring, and revising the multiple ways to explore anew America's international relations. From the very inception of SHAFR in 1967, its members have engaged in a lively debate over the monikers of both the organization and its journal, *Diplomatic History*. They sought names that reflected, in the broadest sense, the United States' role in the world, but without either limiting the discussion to elites or losing the focus on America. Today, other fields and disciplines encroach on the terrain of U.S. foreign relations so that American studies scholars and cultural diplomatic historians are like peas in a pod. A product of intense interdisciplinary crossings, diplomatic history may have reached the point of cross-fertilization at which one might not be able to recognize it when one sees it. While a focus on the state does distinguish the field, and descriptions of methodology, taxonomies, and pleas for new directions are easy to find, it has become more difficult to settle on a coherent definition of U.S. diplomatic history.<sup>48</sup>

Providing a definition is important because understanding the directions toward which the study of U.S. foreign relations point shows its salience to the larger historical profession. The avenues include understanding American identity and ideology, and the nation's embeddedness in world affairs and global power structures. The mission statement of *Diplomatic History* establishes that the journal is

<sup>47</sup> On resistance to the cultural turn among diplomatic historians, see Thomas Alan Schwartz, "Explaining the Cultural Turn—or Detour?," *Diplomatic History*, 31 (Jan. 2007), 143–47. The State Department's Office of the Historian, with oversight from a congressionally mandated advisory board comprised of scholars representing major scholarly organizations, attempts to publish on events in the *Foreign Relations in the United States* series thirty years after they occur, but the deadline is not always met. Kristin L. Ahlberg and Thomas W. Zeiler, "Public History and Public Audiences: The U.S. Department of State and Its Historical Advisory Committee," *Perspectives on History*, Jan. 2008, <http://www.historians.org/Perspectives/issues/2008/0801/0801pub1.cfm>.

<sup>48</sup> Curiously, the primer of the field offers no definition. See Hogan and Paterson, ed., *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*. See also Stephen E. Pelz, "A Taxonomy for American Diplomatic History," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 19 (Autumn 1988), 259–76.

devoted to U.S. international history and foreign relations, broadly defined, including grand strategy, diplomacy, and issues involving gender, culture, ethnicity, and ideology. It examines U.S. relations in a global and comparative context, and its broad focus appeals to a number of disciplines, including political science, international economics, American history, national security studies, and Latin American, Asian, African, and European studies.

This reveals the journal's wide scope, despite its restrictive title. Even more revealing of the amalgam of defining characteristics of the field is an explanation given in the field's main course reader. The editors Dennis Merrill and Thomas Paterson prefer the term "American foreign relations" to describe the field because "it explains the totality of interactions—economic, cultural, political, military, environmental, and more—among peoples, organizations, states, and systems." In other words, to paraphrase them, the study of U.S. foreign relations (or its better-known name, "diplomatic history") deals with why and how people in the United States from all walks of life intersected with the world outside the nation from the Revolution to the present, and the policies they devised to project and manage U.S. interests in the global arena.<sup>49</sup>

Like all fields in metamorphosis, U.S. foreign relations has embarked on a soul-searching mission to exhibit its credibility to the rest of the profession. Gone is the era when legions of students were obligated to read diplomatic history to understand the world and pass their comprehensive exams. At most institutions, a graduate student in U.S. history can earn a degree without enrolling in a course on foreign relations, though not the other way around.<sup>50</sup> Yet change has been afoot for some time, and one can envision graduate courses on diplomatic history as packed with students as are undergraduate classes on that topic, especially when the most salient issues of our day, which beg for civil engagement and scholarly research, are war, globalization, and development.

The field of diplomatic history has now entered the stream of cutting-edge scholarship, all the while retaining the distinct characteristic of privileging the study of power in the international arena. The elitist arcana, as some might term it, revealed in government archives is paramount to understanding America in the world, even though the state is by no means the sole player in studies of American foreign relations. As former presidents of SHAFR noted in a 2007 forum celebrating the organization's fortieth anniversary, fascination with government and crises continues, but the push toward redefinition is escalating.<sup>51</sup> They take heart in the field's vigorous renovation and urge other historians of the United States to join the stampede of diplomatic historians and others who are internationalizing and otherwise reshaping the study of American history.

<sup>49</sup> *Diplomatic History*, <http://www.colorado.edu/history/diplomatic>. Dennis Merrill and Thomas G. Paterson, *Major Problems in American Foreign Relations*, vol. I: *To 1920* (Boston, 2005), xiv–xv.

<sup>50</sup> McMahon, "Toward a Pluralist Vision," 36.

<sup>51</sup> "The History of SHAFR as Told by Its Past Presidents," *Diplomatic History*, 31 (June 2007), 365–438. Michael H. Hunt pointed out early on new directions in the field. See Michael H. Hunt, "The Long Crisis in U.S. Diplomatic History: Coming to Closure," *ibid.*, 16 (Winter 1992), 115–40.