**Misurare la democrazia**

Nelle pagine che seguono trovate i dati Democracy & Dictatorship (D&D), Polity 5 (P5) e Freedom House (FH) relativi agli ultimi anni disponibili per quattro paesi: Italia, Albania, Cina, Giordania.

Troverete inoltre:

a) un estratto del *codebook* di D&D che spiega il significato delle variabili misurate, come vengono attribuiti i valori alle variabili e quando un paese è classificato come democrazia o dittatura;

b) un estratto del manuale d’uso dell’indice P5 con le modalità di costruzione dell’indice, il significato delle diverse variabili e i valori da attribuire ai diversi casi.

c) La costruzione dell’indice di FH e la spiegazione per l’attribuzione dei valori è invece direttamente consultabile al link dei paesi riportato sotto.

**Utilizzando i dati e le informazioni nelle pagine seguenti, rispondete brevemente alle seguenti domande:**

1. Quando un paese è una democrazia per D&D?
2. Quando un paese può considerarsi democratico per Polity?
3. Quali variabili definiscono il multipartitismo in D&D?
4. Secondo D&D, qual è la caratteristica discriminante tra Italia e Cina?
5. Verificare gli indici FH 2023 dei paesi in tabella e inserirli nell’apposita colonna. Quali sono per FH le principali differenze tra Italia e Albania che rendono i rispettivi indici FH così diversi?
6. Verificate gli indici FH 2020-2023 dei paesi considerati: c’è stato un miglioramento o un peggioramento della democrazia? Per quali paesi? Perché?
7. Utilizzando le informazioni riportate nelle pagine che seguono, calcolare l’indice democracy di D&D, classificando i diversi paesi e riportando gli indici nelle celle vuote in tabella.
8. Utilizzando le informazioni riportate nelle pagine che seguono calcolare gli indici DEMOC, AUTOC e POLITY dei paesi considerati. Riportate la formula di calcolo per esteso e inserite i risultati nelle rispettive celle vuote in tabella.
9. Qual è la differenza tra Albania e Italia che ha un impatto sui rispettivi valori DEMOC, AUTOC e POLITY in P5?
10. Confrontate P5, D&D e FH: ci sono delle variabili considerate da uno ma non dall’altro che riterreste importante misurare? Se sì, quali?
11. Ci sono variabili considerate da FH che non ritenete attributi fondamentali della democrazia?

**COUNTRY DATA**

**Democracy and dictatorship**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **year** | **exselec** | **legselec** | **closed** | **dejure** | **defacto** | **defacto2** | **lparty** | **incumb** | **type2** | **Democracy=1****If not=0** |
| **Italy** | 2008 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 |  |
| **Albania** | 2008 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 |  |
| **China** | 2008 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 |  |
| **Jordan** | 2008 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 |  |

**Polity 5**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **country** | **year** | **democ** | **autoc** | **polity** | **xrcomp** | **xropen** | **xconst** | **parreg** | **parcomp** |
| **Italy** | **2018** |   |   |  | 3 | 4 | 7 | 5 | 5 |
| **Albania** | **2018** |   |   |  | 3 | 4 | 7 | 2 | 4 |
| **China** | **2018** |   |   |  | 1 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 1 |
| **Jordan** | **2018** |   |   |  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 4 |

**Freedom House 2023 (**<https://freedomhouse.org/explore-the-map?type=fiw&year=2023>

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Country** | **Score** | **Links to country reports** |
| **Italy** |  | <https://freedomhouse.org/country/italy/freedom-world/2023>  |
| **Albania** |  | <https://freedomhouse.org/country/albania/freedom-world/2023>  |
| **China** |  | https://freedomhouse.org/country/china/freedom-world/2023 |
| **Jordan** |  | https://freedomhouse.org/country/jordan/freedom-world/2023 |

**D&D Democracy and Dictatorship – Codebook extracts**

**exselec**

Mode of effective executive selection:

1. Direct election (election of the effective executive by popular vote or the

election of committed delegates for the purpose of executive selection)

2. Indirect election (selection of the effective executive by an elected assembly or

by an elected but uncommitted electoral college)

3. Nonelective (any means of executive selection not involving a direct or indirect

mandate from an electorate)

**legselec**

Mode of legislative selection:

0. No legislature exists (includes cases in which there is a constituent assembly

without ordinary legislative powers)

1. Non‐elective legislature (examples include the selection of legislators by the

effective executive, or on the basis of heredity or ascription)

2. Elective (legislators, or members of the lower house in a bicameral system, are

selected by means of either direct or indirect popular election)

**closed**

Status of legislature

0. Legislature is closed

1. Legislature is appointed

2. Legislature is elected

**dejure**

Legal status of parties

0. All parties legally banned

1. Legally single party state

2. Multiple parties legally allowed

**defacto**

Existence of parties

0 = No parties

1 = One party

2 = Multiple parties

N.B. We collected separate variables for **dejure** and **defacto** status of parties

because legal status alone is not always a good reflection of empirical reality.

Both **dejure** and **defacto** refer to existence of parties in general, not whether they have seats in the legislature.

**defacto2**

Existence of parties outside of regime front

0. No parties

1. One party or multiple parties, but they belong to regime front

2. Multiple parties

**lparty**

Parties within the legislature

0. Either no legislature or all members of the legislature are nonpartisan

1. Legislature with only members from the regime party

2. Legislature with multiple parties

**incumb**

Consolidation of incumbent advantage. Dummy variable coded 1 if: (1) the regime year

qualifies as a democratic regime and (2) sometime during its current tenure in office the

incumbents (person, party, military hierarchy) unconstitutionally closed the lower house

of the national legislature and rewrote the rules in their favor.

We expand the action that characterizes consolidation of incumbent advantage to include cases in which the

incumbent was first elected in multiparty elections but, for whatever reasons, the

incumbent’s term was extended and subsequent elections were postponed (e.g., Angola

as of December 31, 2008).

**type2**

Dummy variable coded 1 for the cases excluded from the set of democracies uniquely

because they violate the “alternation” rule; 0 otherwise. These are the cases that would

be classified as democratic if the only criteria for democracy were multiparty (direct or

indirect) executive and legislative elections. This, however, as discussed in Przeworski et

al (2000:23‐29) and in Cheibub, Vreeland and Gandhi (2009), is not sufficient to identify

democracies. In the set of regimes that hold multiparty elections, some do it only

because they know the opposition cannot win and others because the opposition would

not be allowed to assume office if it won. The difficulty is that in many cases there is no

historical evidence to allow the observer to distinguish these cases. Thus, it is possible

that we might identify as a democracy a case that is a real dictatorship, or as a

dictatorship a case that is a real democracy. The alternation rule, as well as the present

variable, identifies the cases for which we do not have sufficient information to decide,

according to our rules, whether the country is a democracy or not.

**democracy**

Dummy variable coded 1 if the regime qualifies as democratic, 0 if non-democratic.

The conditions for a country to be democratic (democracy=1) are the following:

**democracy**=1 if:

* **exselec** ≤2 (and)
* **legselec**=2 (and) **closed**=2 (and)
* **dejure**=2 (and) **defacto**=2 (and) **defacto2**=2 (and) **lparty***=2* (and)
* **type2**=0 (and)
* **incumb**=0

**POLITY 5 – User manual extract**

**DEMOC:**

The Democracy index is an additive eleven-point scale (0-10). The operational indicator of

democracy is derived from codings of the competitiveness of political participation (variable 3.6), the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment (variables 3.3 and 3.2), and constraints on the chief executive (variable 3.4) using the following weights:



This "institutional democracy" index follows a logic similar to that underlying the Polity I analyses.

There is no "necessary condition" for characterizing a political system as democratic, rather

democracy is treated as a variable. For example, the scale discriminates among Western

parliamentary and presidential systems based on the extent of constraints on the chief executive.

Charles de Gaulle as president of the French Fifth Republic operated within slight to moderate

political limitations. Thus the early years of the Fifth Republic have lower Democracy scores than

the United States or the Federal Republic of Germany, where constraints on the executive

approach parity.

**AUTOC:**

An eleven-point Autocracy scale is constructed additively. Our operational index score of autocracy

is derived from codings of the competitiveness of political participation (variable 3.6), the regulation

of participation (variable 3.5), the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment (variables 3.2 and 3.3), and constraints on the chief executive (variable 3.4) using the following weights:



**POLITY:**

Combined Polity Score: The POLITY score is computed by subtracting the AUTOC score from the

DEMOC score; the resulting unified polity scale ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10

(strongly autocratic).

**COMPONENT VARIABLES:**

**3.2 XRCOMP (all versions)**

Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment: Competitiveness refers to the extent that prevailing modes of advancement give subordinates equal opportunities to become superordinates (Gurr 1974, 1483).

(1) Selection: Chief executives are determined by hereditary succession, designation, or by a combination of both, as in monarchies whose chief minister is chosen by king or court. Examples of pure designative selection are rigged, unopposed elections; repeated replacement of presidents before their terms end; recurrent military selection of civilian executives; selection within an institutionalized single party; recurrent incumbent selection of successors; repeated election boycotts by the major opposition parties, etc.

(2) Dual/Transitional: Dual executives in which one is chosen by hereditary succession, the other by competitive election. Also used for transitional arrangements between selection (ascription and/or designation) and competitive election.

(3) Election: Chief executives are typically chosen in or through competitive elections matching two or more major parties or candidates. (Elections may be popular or by an elected assembly.)

**3.3 XROPEN (all versions)**

Openness of Executive Recruitment: Recruitment of the chief executive is "open" to the extent that all the politically active population has an opportunity, in principle, to attain the position through a regularized process. Four categories are used:

(1) Closed: Chief executives are determined byhereditary succession, e.g. kings, emperors, beys, emirs, etc. who assume executive powers by right of descent. An executive selected by other means may proclaim himself a monarch but the polity he governs is not coded "closed" unless a relative actually succeeds him as ruler.

(2) Dual Executive–Designation: Hereditary succession plus executive or court selection of an effective chief minister.

(3) Dual Executive–Election: Hereditary succession plus electoral selection of an effective chief minister.

(4) Open: Chief executives are chosen by elite designation, competitive election, or transitional arrangements between designation and election.

**3.4 XCONST (all versions)**

Executive Constraints (Decision Rules): Operationally, this variable refers to the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decisionmaking powers of chief executives, whether individuals or collectivities. Such limitations may be imposed by any "accountability groups." In Western democracies these are usually legislatures. Other kinds of accountability groups are the ruling party in a one-party state; councils of nobles or powerful advisors in monarchies; the military in coup-prone polities; and in many states a strong, independent judiciary. The concern is therefore with the checks and balances between the various parts of the decision-making process. A seven-category scale is used.

(1) Unlimited Authority: There are no regular limitations on the executive's actions (as distinct from irregular limitations such as the threat or actuality of coups and assassinations). Examples of evidence: i. Constitutional restrictions on executive action are ignored. ii. Constitution is frequently revised or suspended at the executive's initiative. iii. There is no legislative assembly, or there is one but it is called and dismissed at the executive's pleasure. iv. The executive appoints a majority of members of any accountability group and can remove them at will. v. The legislature cannot initiate legislation or veto or suspend acts of the executive. vi. Rule by decree is repeatedly used.

(2) Intermediate Category

(3) Slight to Moderate Limitation on Executive Authority: There are some real but limited restraints on the executive. Evidence: i. The legislature initiates some categories of legislation. ii. The legislature blocks implementation of executive acts and decrees. iii. Attempts by the executive to change some constitutional restrictions, such as prohibitions on succeeding himself, or extending his term, fail and are not adopted. iv. The ruling party initiates some legislation or takes some administrative action independently of the executive. v. The legislature or party approves some categories of appointments nominated by the executive. vi. There is an independent judiciary. vii. Situations in which there exists a civilian executive, but in which policy decisions, for all practical purposes, reflect the demands of the military.

(4) Intermediate Category

(5) Substantial Limitations on Executive Authority: The executive has more effective authority than any accountability group but is subject to substantial constraints by them. Examples: i. A legislature or party council often modifies or defeats executive proposals for action. ii. A council or legislature sometimes refuses funds to the executive. iii. The accountability group makes important appointments to administrative posts. iv. The legislature refuses the executive permission to leave the country.

(6) Intermediate Category

(7) Executive Parity or Subordination: Accountability groups have effective authority equal to or greater than the executive in most areas of activity. Examples of evidence: i. A legislature, ruling party, or council of nobles initiates much or most important legislation. ii. The executive (president, premier, king, cabinet, council) is chosen by the accountability group and is dependent on its continued support to remain in office (as in most parliamentary systems). iii. In multi-party democracies, there is chronic "cabinet instability."

**3.5 PARREG (all versions)**

Regulation of Participation: Participation is regulated to the extent that there are binding rules on when, whether, and how political preferences are expressed. One-party states and Western democracies both regulate participation but they do so in different ways, the former by channeling participation through a single party structure, with sharp limits on diversity of opinion; the latter by allowing relatively stable and enduring groups to compete nonviolently for political influence. The polar opposite is unregulated participation, in which there are no enduring national political organizations and no effective regime controls on political activity. A five-category scale is used to code this dimension:

(1) Unregulated: Political participation is fluid; there are no enduring national political organizations and no systematic regime controls on political activity. Political groupings tend to form around particular leaders, regional interests, religious or ethnic or clan groups, etc.; but the number and relative importance of such groups in national political life varies substantially over time.

(2) Multiple Identity: There are relatively stable and enduring political groups which compete for political influence at the national level–parties, regional groups, or ethnic groups, not necessarily elected–but there are few, recognized overlapping (common) interests.

(3) Sectarian: Political demands are characterized by incompatible interests and intransigent posturing among multiple identity groups and oscillate more or less regularly between intense factionalism and government favoritism, that is, when one identity group secures central power it favors group members in central allocations and restricts competing groups' political activities, until it is displaced in turn (i.e., active factionalism). Also coded here are polities in which political groups are based on restricted membership and significant portions of the population historically have been excluded from access to positions of power (latent factionalism, e.g., indigenous peoples in some South American countries).

(4) Restricted: Some organized political participation is permitted without intense factionalism but significant groups, issues, and/or types of conventional participation are regularly excluded from the political process.

(5) Regulated: Relatively stable and enduring political groups regularly compete for political influence and positions with little use of coercion. No significant groups, issues, or types of conventional political action are regularly excluded from the political process.

**3.6 PARCOMP (all versions)**

The Competitiveness of Participation: The competitiveness of participation refers to the extent to which alternative preferences for policy and leadership can be pursued in the political arena. Competitiveness is coded on a fivecategory scale:

(0) Not Applicable: This is used for polities that are coded as Unregulated, or moving to/from that position, in Regulation of Political Participation (variable 2.6).

(1) Repressed: No significant oppositional activity is permitted outside the ranks of the regime and ruling party. Totalitarian party systems, authoritarian military dictatorships, and despotic monarchies are typically coded here. However, the mere existence of these structures is not sufficient for a Repressed coding. The regime's institutional structure must also be matched by its demonstrated ability to repress oppositional competition.

(2) Suppressed: Some organized, political competition occurs outside government, without serious factionalism; but the regime systematically and sharply limits its form, extent, or both in ways that exclude substantial groups (20% or more of the adult population) from participation. Suppressed competition is distinguished from Factional competition (below) by the systematic, persisting nature of the restrictions: large classes of people, groups, or types of peaceful political competition are continuously excluded from the political process. As an operational rule, the banning of a political party which received more than 10% of the vote in a recent national election is sufficient evidence that competition is "suppressed." However, other information is required to determine whether the appropriate coding is (2) Suppressed or (3) Factional competition. This category is also used to characterize transitions between Factional and Repressed competition. Examples of "suppression" are: i. Prohibiting some kinds of political organizations, either by type or group of people involved (e.g., no national political parties or no ethnic political organizations). ii. Prohibiting some kinds of political action (e.g., Communist parties may organize but are prohibited from competing in elections). iii. Systematic harassment of political opposition (leaders killed, jailed, or sent into exile; candidates regularly ruled off ballots; opposition media banned, etc.). This is evidence for either Factional, Suppressed, or Repressed, depending on the nature of the regime, the opposition, and the persistence of political groups.

(3) Factional: Polities with parochial or ethnic-based political factions that regularly compete for political influence in order to promote particularist agendas and favor group members to the detriment of common, secular, or cross-cutting agendas.

(4) Transitional: Any transitional arrangement from Restricted, Suppressed, or Factional patterns to fully Competitive patterns, or vice versa. Transitional arrangements are accommodative of competing, parochial interests but have not fully linked parochial with broader, general interests. Sectarian and secular interest groups coexist.

(5) Competitive: There are relatively stable and enduring, secular political groups which regularly compete for political influence at the national level; ruling groups and coalitions regularly, voluntarily transfer central powerto competing groups. Competition among groups seldom involves coercion or disruption. Small parties or political groups may be restricted in the Competitive pattern.