



POLICY DESIGN: HOW TO DESIGN EFFECTIVE POLICIES



WHAT IS POLICY DESIGN?

The systematic effort to design effective and efficient programs by using knowledge about tools and means to reach a given goal.

WHAT DO YOU HAVE TO DESIGN?

The design of your policy should embody:

1. A theory of change: how do I solve the problem?
2. A theory of action: how do I implement the program?

In both cases, you will need the cooperation of actors who are independent and sometimes


POLICIES ARE OFTEN REPRESENTED AS FOLLOWS:



But public policies are not clinical trials:

- They are not standard treatment, but *how they work is often unclear*
- They are not automatically *implemented*
- They target *active subjects*
- They are implemented in *contexts that are not neutral*

DI FATTO, LA REALTÀ È PIÙ SIMILE A QUESTO:





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1. DESIGN and POLICY TOOLS

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


1. DESIGN AND POLICY TOOLS




**THINK TO YOUR PROBLEM:
WHAT CAN YOU DO ABOUT IT?**

**Public Policy Choices
(Public Policy Strategies)**



Source: Adapted from Charles W. Anderson, *Statecraft*, 1977, pp. 56 ff.

FIGURE 1.3
The Minimalist Approach—Twofold Classifications of Governance Tools



*Sources: L.L. Bernard, **Social Control in Its Sociological Aspects** (1939), pp. 13ff.; J. Brigham and D.W. Brown, **Political Implementation** (1980), pp. 9ff.*

CARROTS, STICKS, SERMONS (ORGANIZZAZIONI, ISTITUZIONI E NUDGE)



Carrot



Stick



Sermon



Rewards




Regulations



Information

The government may either force us, pay us or have us pay, or persuade us.

COERCION AND POLICY TOOLS



	Stimulative	Repressive
Communicative control model	Information	Propaganda
Economic control model	Subsidy	Levy
Judicial control model	Contract/Covenant	Order/Prohibition

1. REGULATION - STICKS

Use the coercive and sanctioning power of the state

Substantial goals: All those tools that regulate behaviours of target groups and beneficiaries (ex. Standards, prohibitions, duties, powers...)


Procedural goals: change procedures and decisional processes (ex. Make citizens participate, require external evaluators to be involved, etc.)

1. REGULATION - STICKS

Regulatory bias: traditional instrument, cheap, quick, great political capital

It is effective if controls and sanctions are possible; if not it is just symbolic

Legitimacy is part of the story: in a democracy you cannot really impose anything on people (you cannot control everybody)



BENEFITS OF TECHNICAL NORMS

(SOURCE: IRS FOR UNI)

[HTTPS://WWW.UNI.COM/INDEX.PHP?OPTION=COM_CONTENT&VIEW=ARTICLE&ID=5571%3AIMPRESE-STUDIO-CONFERMA-CHE-CON-NORME-TECNICHE-CRESCE-FATTURATO-SICUREZZA-COMPETENZA&CATID=171&ITEMID=2612](https://www.uni.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=5571%3AIMPRESE-STUDIO-CONFERMA-CHE-CON-NORME-TECNICHE-CRESCE-FATTURATO-SICUREZZA-COMPETENZA&catid=171&itemid=2612)

Posizione media in classifica	Vantaggio/beneficio	Ascensori	Macchine utensili lavorazione metalli	Arredamento
1	Facilitazione del rispetto dei requisiti di sicurezza di legge	96,6	85,4	76
2	Facilitazione di accesso ai mercati esteri	84,1	75	83,9
3	Semplificazione del corretto svolgimento delle attività d'impresa	94,4	74	43,1
4	Influenza positiva sull'esito di eventuali contestazioni giudiziarie	77	77,8	68,9
5	Riduzione del rischio di incidenti per gli utilizzatori	85,9	72	41,1
6	Riduzione del rischio di incidenti sul lavoro	80,7	70,6	42,1

THE ITALIAN POLICY



1997-2005

VAT Exemptions (1997), VAT Deductions (1999), Partial deductions of the value of donations (2005)

2003

Good Samaritan Law 155/2003

2016

Law 166/2016 against food waste:


- New organisations and new items
- Waste fees discounts
- Bureaucratic simplifications
- Food after the best-before date becomes donatable

FOOD AFTER THE BEST BEFORE DATE

DESIGN FEATURES:

- BBD food can be donated to associations recovering and preparing food

Hypothesis:



A) Legal permission to donate food after the BBD enlarge the range of donable food



B) Donors will divert food after the BBD from disposal to donation



C) Food after the BBD is recovered and redistributed

PRODUCTION AND MANUFACTURING*:


	Ambient	Chilled	Frozen	Total
Internal sell-by date reached (%)	63.9	68.8	87.1	66.9
Product non-compliance (%)	16.2	5.4	1.4	12.2
Product refusals (%)	7.5	13.1	8.3	9.1
Packaging non-compliance (%)	6.8	4.0	2.1	5.7
Returns of unsold product (%)	5.6	8.7	1.1	6.1
Surplus food – Italy (1,000 tonnes per year)	118.2	51.5	11.7	181.4
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

DISTRIBUTION CENTRES*:

Retail distribution centres

Internal sell-by date reached (%)	48.7
Returns of unsold product (%)	28.1
Product non-compliance (%)	12.8
Packaging non-compliance (%)	10.4
Surplus food – Italy (1,000 tonnes per year)	73.6

*Garrone, Melacini, Perego (2014) Surplus food recovery and donations in Italy, British Food Journal, 116(9): 1460-77



NOT ALL DONORS ARE CREATED EQUAL!

Supermarkets may provide lower-quality food:

- shelf-life game: donate as late as possible / partly shift waste costs to associations
- less recoverability


Manufacturers and producers have reputational fears:

- Reputational risks cannot be protected by the law
- Resistance to sell food after the BBD

A) Legal permission to donate food after the BBD enlarge the range of donable food



B) Donors will divert food after the BBD from disposal to donation



C) Food after the BBD is recovered and redistributed


(Recovering surplus produced by shops is difficult)

- Food banks avoid food after the BBD
- Associations preparing meals may use this food profitably

RESULTS:


A) Legal permission to donate food after the BBD increases the range of donatable food:

- *Consumers are the main producers but are not targeted by the policy*
- *Producers, manufacturers and retail distribution centres produce little surplus after the BBD*



B) Donors will donate food after the BBD rather than disposing of it:

- *Beware of retailers playing 'shelf-life games'*
- *Manufacturers will resist donations because of reputational risks*



C) Food after the BBD is recovered and redistributed:

- *Organizations preparing meals may use this food*
- *Organizations distributing aid packs may refuse this food*

2. CARROTS-ECONOMIC INCENTIVES



It's mostly money transfers:

Substantial goals: positive and negative incentives (ex. Subsidies, fees, vouchers, deduction, etc.)

Procedural goals: change procedures and decisional processes (ex. Financing newspapers)

2. CARROTS — ECONOMIC INCENTIVES

They can be affirmative (promoting behaviours) or negative (disincentive)

Medium level of coercion

Risks: short-term effect, perverse incentives, market imbalances, deficient take-up






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
La cultura che ti piace

Source: Elaborazioni Tortuga su dati MIBACT

Spesa per ambito



CINEMA



EVENTI CULTURALI



MUSEI, MONUMENTI E PARCHI NATURA



CONCERTI



LIBRI



TEATRO E DANZA




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
La cultura che ti piace

Source: Elaborazioni Tortuga su dati MIBACT

Numero giornaliero di buoni generati



Andamento spesa giornaliera aggregata






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
La cultura che ti piace

Fonte: Elaborazioni Tortuga su dati MIBACT

Percentuale di take-up a livello provinciale



Percentuale di take-up per macroarea



3. INFORMATION - SERMONS



They use knowledge, data and information to influence the behaviour of target groups.

Substantial goals: production and diffusion of information (ex. Awareness campaigns, production of statistics, polls, surveys, monitoring systems, etc.)

Procedural goals: they regulate the use and access of information (ex: transparency of performance data)



3. INFORMATION - SERMONS!

Knowledge-augmenting (motivating) vs preference manipulation (promotional)

- You can communicate facts or values
- Uni-directional /multi-directional
- It can support other instruments

WHEN?

- Negative theory of compliance
- Theory of coinciding interests
- Crisis theory and difficult oversight

SOME EXAMPLES:



<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mA9p58rzPTQ&feature=youtu.be>

Small Talk Saves Lives

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VDchxgZxjcm&feature=youtu.be>

Breck's Last Game

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=alwl6roEmK0&feature=youtu.be>

RISKS OF INFORMATION

Providing information to increase the information gap: you reach only the ones more interested and already informed

People normally screen the information according to what they like or already know (so called cognitive dissonance). Confirmation bias and possibility of multiple interpretations

Sometimes is purely symbolic – it serves only to promote values, show commitment or pave the way for other tools

It is easy but don't expect great impacts

BOOMERANG EFFECT


1985. The Danish government stops its campaign against fires caused by tossed butts

7 years during the campaign: 175 fires
years average, 256 hectares

7 years after the stop: 98 fires year
average, 177 hectares

Arson attacks gone from 51 a year
to 18 a year

The hypothesis was false – it actually
increased fires



TOSSED BUTTS
START FIRES.

 TORONTO | Call **311**



4. ORGANISATION – PUBLIC SERVICES

Direct use of the organisational capacity (structures and staff) of public administrations and government agencies (included their reorganisation and reform)

Substantial goals: the entire production of public services and public activities (ex: public works, research, judicial services, social assistance, defence, health...)


Procedural goals: changing how public administrations and agencies work (ex. Administrative reforms, government reviews, inter-agency coordination, task forces, etc.)

5. NEW INSTITUTIONS FOR POLICY PROBLEMS?


Every problem seems to require a specific institution

But it is not always a good idea in terms of effectiveness (i.e. solving the original policy problem)


HOW TO SOLVE A POLICY PROBLEM WITH A NEW INSTITUTIONAL SETTING



DO YOU REMEMBER THE TRANSPORT GOVERNANCE BEFORE THE GLA?



6. NUDGES



Using rationality bias to design successful policies

Mid-level of coercion

BIAS AND COGNITIVE SHORTCUTS (KAHNEMAN)

Anchoring: Evaluating is comparing:

- 1) Are you happy?
- 2) Are you successful in love?

Availability: Frequency is judged on the ability to find examples:

Are you scared of a heart attack? Are you scared of plane accidents?

PROSPECT THEORY

Let's imagine I give you 1 000€, and ask you to choose one of the following:

1. 50% of probability to win other 1 000€ (we toss a coin)
2. I'll give you other 500€

Which one do you pick?

PROSPECT THEORY

Imagine I give you 2000€, and ask you to choose one of the following:

1. 50% of probability of losing 1000€
2. Losing 500€ for sure

Which one do you pick?

PROSPECT THEORY

In both cases the choice is the following:

- 1) Betting on being richer either of 1 000€ or 2000€,
- 2) Have 1 500€ for sure.

You should have no preferences depending on how the question is formulated, but most people prefers 500€ in the first case and betting in the second case

DESIGNING ORGAN DONATIONS

JOHNSON – GOLDSTEIN 2003, DO DEFAULTS SAVE LIVES?

GOAL: FAVOURING ORGAN DONATION

RATIONAL APPROACH: EXPLICIT CONSENT

IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOUR: ONLY 40% OF PEOPLE IN FAVOUR OF DONATING GIVE THEIR CONSENT

AN EXPERIMENT:

1 CLICK TO GIVE CONSENT = 42% DONORS

1 CLICK TO DENY CONSENT = 82% DONORS

NO DEFAULT = 79% DONORS

THE ARCHITECTURE OF CHOICE DETERMINES WHAT YOU CHOOSE – IT IS NOT A RATIONAL PROCESS STARTING WITH YOUR GOALS AND SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS

AN EXAMPLE: BAD DIETARY HABITS

		RISORSE GOVERNATIVE			
		<i>Information</i>	<i>Authority</i>	<i>Economic</i>	<i>Organisation</i>
GOALS	<i>Substantial</i>	New labelling	Forbidden nutrients, quality street food	Soda-tax, Supporting Farmers' markets	Planning, new systems of mobility
	<i>Procedural</i>	Monitoring food habits	Participation of parents association in deciding school meals	...	Food councils, Food units

WHAT ABOUT YOUR PROJECT?

		RISORSE GOVERNATIVE			
		<i>Information</i>	<i>Authority</i>	<i>Economic</i>	<i>Organisation</i>
GOALS	<i>Substantial</i>				
	<i>Procedural</i>				

HOW DO WE CHOOSE THE RIGHT TOOL?

Technical criteria: efficiency, effectiveness, quality...

Politico-administrative criteria: path dependency, culture, policy sectors...

Timing: from the less to the most coercive

Give and take strategy: mixing repression and stimulation

**POLICY TOOLS GIVE YOU IDEAS, BUT
DESIGNING IS A TAILORING JOB**

Example 1:

Regenerating a difficult neighbourhood

- There are several ways to treat a degraded neighbourhood
- Causes are ambiguous, multiple and cumulated
- There is not an organised network of actors
- Interventions are ‘place-based’ and hard to standardise

Nonetheless, local development projects normally use the same array of tools but with great difference in outcomes

(then you should not look for success only in the kind of tool)

EU LOCAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN BERLIN (2000-2006/2007-2013) (IRS-IGOP, 2011)

- In 1999, in Germany a new program is launched “Socially Integrative City”
- The goal is to develop degraded areas
- Different interventions (infrastructures, financial support, employment policies.)

It is a complete success:

- Spending rate is about 100%
- Almost all projects are finished on time
- Employment targets are reached
- Project spin-offs after the end of funding period
- Great participation by citizens

Design details

PROJECT DETAILS

- 3 funds (EU, National, Lander)
- 30 'concentrated areas' (about 10000 people)
- Direct involvement of the Senate Urban department and Districts
- Creation of Neighbourhood Councils (NCs)
- Creation of Neighbourhood Teams (NTs)
- Jour Fix (incontro trimestrale)
- Cooperation contracts between districts and Senate

The 'NEIGHBOURHOOD FUNDS (NF)'

NF#1: short-term projects up to € 1,000. Proposed by residents, selected by the NCs and managed by NTs


NF#2: € 1,000 - € 10,000. Same procedure.

NF#3: € 10,000 to 50.000. The selection is done by NCs but formal procedure of acceptance with the district

NF#4: above € 50,000, local supervision but selection by the Boroughs and Senate.

EXAMPLE 2: AUTHORISING SPORT INFRASTRUCTURES

The same procedure but different results



Average Time Administration 1: 10 days

Average Time Administration B: from 40 to 180 days

Why?

QUINDI:


1. Gli strumenti sono classi di interventi, ma non sono gli interventi
2. L'intervento deve essere definito in modo preciso riguardo a:
 - Caratteristiche e procedure
 - Risorse
 - Soggetti coinvolti
 - Interazione
 - Gruppo target
 - Ecc.

FLASHBACK: L'OGGETTO DEL POLICY DESIGN

1. Una teoria del cambiamento (come risolvo il problema)
2. Una teoria dell'azione (come attuo l'intervento)

In entrambi i casi, il presupposto è che è necessaria la cooperazione di attori potenzialmente autonomi e indipendenti

RIPRENDENDO UNO SCHEMA GIÀ VISTO:



DECISIONI E «IMPLEMENTATION GAP»

1. Le decisioni esistono (nella realtà) soltanto una volta attuate
2. Purtroppo, l'attuazione non è (quasi mai) automatica, ma esiste un gap tra decisione e implementazione
3. I problemi non si risolvono formulando e approvando una nuova politica

UN ESEMPIO: LA VALORIZZAZIONE DEL PORTO DI BRINDISI (PROGRAMMAZIONE 2000-2006)

Dicembre 2001: Viene redatto il primo progetto del PIT.

Aprile 2003: Superando diverse conflittualità locali, i partner PIT firmano la proposta di programma.

Marzo 2004: Il Nucleo di Valutazione regionale dà parere favorevole al progetto.

Giugno 2004: Elezioni comunali, cambio di maggioranze nella provincia di Brindisi

Novembre 2004: si firma l'atto di convenzione e si disciplina l'Ufficio Unico

Aprile 2005: Nichi Vendola subentra a Raffaele Fitto alla guida della regione

Giugno 2005: Regione e Provincia di Brindisi firmano la convenzione per dare il via al PIT.

IL TERRITORIO DEL PIT: FASANO, FRANCAVILLA, OSTUNI, BRINDISI



Denominazione progetti PIT 7	Descrizione
Brindisi. raccordo ferroviario retroporto di Brindisi e nuovo parco merci	collegamento ferroviario diretto FS - zona industriale di Brindisi per carico diretto merci
Fasano, Francavilla, Ostuni. Fognatura e adeguamento reti idriche	Costruzione di collettori principali e secondari, adeguamento reti fognarie, costruzione impianti di depurazione comuni a servizio delle aree industriali
Brindisi, Fasano, Francavilla, Ostuni. Adeguamento viario.	Interventi di collegamento delle aree industriali con punti di snodo viario e ferroviario; adeguamento viabilità interna alle aree.
Promozione territoriale	Missioni investitori esteri Turchia, Bulgaria, Egitto, Cina.
Patto per l'inclusione sociale	Borse lavoro di inserimento lavorativo + Osservatorio Illegalità
Programmi integrati di agevolazione (PIA)	Regimi di aiuto per imprese di medie dimensioni
Formazione superiore + Borse di studio	5 master nelle Università di Bari, Brindisi, Lecce

DOPO LA DECISIONE: COSA SUCCEDE DOPO?

GENNAIO 2005: Nomina del PIT manager

AGOSTO 2006: Borse di studio, nomina responsabili Fasano e Francavilla, bando per esperti a supporto del PIT

FEBBRAIO 2006: Accordo Ministero, Regione, Provincia, Comune, Autorità Portuale per integrazione fondi

OTTOBRE 2006: Vengono approvati i master

NOVEMBRE 2006: Accordo sugli impegni di spesa dei progetti infrastrutturali, ma non per il raccordo ferroviario di Brindisi

2007: Vengono pubblicati i bandi per parte dei progetti infrastrutturali

2008: Vengono pubblicati i restanti bandi e fatte le missioni internazionali

2009: Nuove elezioni amministrative, Cambia il PIT manager

ATTUAZIONE AL 2011

http://www.regione.puglia.it/web/packages/progetti/nvvp/PUV/ALLEGATI_PIT_Puglia_rev_DIC_2011.pdf

Progetti Infrastrutturali PIT 7	?	Note
Brindisi. viabilità zona industriale.	QUASI	ANAS
Brindisi. Nuovo raccordo ferroviario con il nuovo parco merci (26m€)	NO	Fondi, RFI
Brindisi. Potenziamento del raccordo ferroviario (consortile) a servizio dell'area retroportuale.	QUASI	Problema linea Elett.
Fasano. Realizzazione della rete di fognatura nera a servizio dell'area industriale di Fasano Nord.	QUASI	Inadempienza ditta
Fasano. Realizzazione della rete di fognatura nera a servizio dell'area industriale di Fasano Sud.	OK	
Fasano. Realizzazione della bretella di collegamento del Centro Agroalimentare alla viabilità nazionale SS16.	OK	
Francavilla Fontana. Realizzazione delle rete idrica e fognante nell'area industriale.	NO	Espropri, RUP
Francavilla Fontana. Lavori di costruzione della bretella di collegamento tra la SS 7, il Centro di Carico Intermodale e l'ex SS 603.	OK	
Ostuni. Realizzazione della rete di fognatura nera a servizio dell'agglomerato industriale di Ostuni.	QUASI	fibra ottica
Ostuni. Sistemazione della viabilità ed aree a parcheggio nella zona industriale con completamento della pubblica illuminazione.	OK	
Brindisi. Infrastrutturazione info-telematica del sistema territoriale di Brindisi.	OK	
Fasano. Estensione della rete di fognatura nera a servizio dell'area industriale di Fasano Nord.	OK	

UN'ANALISI DELL'INSUCCESSO

Non ci sono problemi di legalità, ma:

- Alcuni eventi imprevisti.
- Alcuni problemi di progettazione.
- Effetti perversi del ciclo elettorale.
- Avvicendamento degli attori (RFI).
- Ecc.

Una storia tipica... Potrebbe essere evitata?

IL NUMERO DI VARIABILI (E DI RICERCHE) È POTENZIALMENTE INFINITO

Author(s)	and	Variables
Ackermann and Steinmann (1982)		resources, interorganizational structure
Alexander (1985)		stimulus, policy, program, implementation; contextual, organizational, environmental, perceptual variables
Altenstetter and Bjorkman (1976, 1977)		goal ambiguity
Ball (1976)		decisional clarity, consensus, and reiteration; personnel attitudes, enforcement resources, reputational authority, homogeneity of issue public, cost of abatement, role of local media
Baum (1976, 1981)		clarity of directives, accuracy with which decisions are communicated, interests of subordinates, subordinate policy preferences, authority, insulation, sanctioning, persuasion, branch of government, structure of interorganizational interdependence, Sabatier and Mazmanian checklist
Berman & McLaughlin (1976); Berman (1978); McLaughlin (1976)		(local) institutional context has major impact, especially organizational climate and motivations of participants (materials development, staff training, planning, frequent meetings); federal policy, technology, and resources: little influence

Berman (1980)	Important variables depend on context (organizational, political, social and legal). Clarity of policy goals, number of actors participating, implementers' degree of resistance , ineffectualness, or inefficiency; degree of control exerted from top.
Bowen (1982)	clearances, number of actors, persistence , time
Bowman (1984)	tension, contextual factors (e.g., economic context)
Browne and Wildavsky (1984)	formal policy (clarity of objectives and priorities, validity of theory of causality, sufficiency of financial resources, sufficiency of power); learning/adaptation
Browning, Marshall, and Tabb (1981, 1984); Browning and Marshall (1976)	local context primary (especially orientations of local targets, ideology of local dominant coalitions), statute secondary; time
Bryner (1981)	clarity of statute, level of general political support
Bullock (1980)	clarity of statutory standards or objectives, degree of agency support , 'presence or absence of programmatic bias favoring the attainment of the agency's responsibilities,' 'attitudes of the agency's sovereigns'
Bunker (1972)	'The degree to which an organization (a) is consensually clear about its task, (b) is appropriately differentiated into parts related to its pertinent sub-environments, (c) is integrated by information exchanges and effective conflict management devices, (d) has clear knowledge about its performance, and (e) is self-reflective and able to make corrective adjustments in its own behavior'; issue salience , power resources, agreement
Chase (1979)	operational demands, resources, authority, support: 44 'factors for consideration'; structure of interdependence

Gross et al. (1971)	implementers' clarity about innovation, needed skills and knowledge, availability of materials, compatibility of organizational arrangements with innovation , degree of staff motivation
Gunn (1978) Hogwood and Gunn (1984)	nature of policy, implementation structure, outside interference , control over implementers, resources, valid theory
Hambleton (1983)	policy message; multiplicity of agents, perspectives, and ideologies; resources; politics of planning
Hargrove (1983)	type of policy (distributive, regulatory, redistributive)
Hays (1982)	local political conflicts , degree of mediation of local agency
Hucke (1978)	conditions in agency's implementation field
Levitt (1980)	timescale for introducing legal powers, public expenditure policy, opportunity cost, policy as a 'sacrificial victim,' outside pressure, policy instruments, certainty of benefits from action, policy formulation as an end in itself, stability of interorganizational relationships , elements of surprise and power after governmental change, images, consultation, learning, public opinion, trends in interest groups' perceptions, media, international policy-making
Luft (1976)	incentives
McLanahan (1980)	goal specificity, degree of centralization, interest-group participation , public accountability

Murphy (1971, 1973, 1974, 1976)	degree of support among implementers, adequacy of staff, strength of monitoring , law and tradition, constituency pressure
Nakamura and Smallwood (1980)	specificity of policy, technical limitations, actors, arenas, organizational structures, bureaucratic norms , resources, motivations, communication networks, compliance mechanisms
Nixon (1980)	clarity and consistency of communication
O'Brien (1980)	overlapping and conflicting provisions of law
Pesso (1978)	rules, supervision
Porter (1976)	task technology, type of interdependence, environment
Pressman and Wildavsky (1984)	multiplicity of participants, perspectives, decision points, intensity of preferences, resources
Raelin (1980, 1982)	power, authority and mandate distributions; quantity of organizations; network leadership ; level of competition and conflict
J. Thompson (1982)	hierarchy , socioeconomic variables
Van Meter and Van Horn (1975), Van Horn (1978, 1979a, 1979b), Van Horn and Van Meter (1976)	policy standards, resources, enforcement, communications, characteristics of implementing agencies, political conditions, economic and social conditions, dispositions of implementers
Weatherley and Lipsky (1977)	resources, coping behaviors of street-level bureaucrats

PRESSMAN & WILDAVSKY

IMPLEMENTATION OR HOW GREAT EXPECTATIONS IN WASHINGTON ARE DASHED IN OAKLAND...

Probabilità di accordo per ogni soggetto coinvolto	Probabilità di successo dopo 70 punti decisionali	Numero di punti decisionali per una probabilità <50%
80	0,000000125	4
90	0,000644	7
95	0,00395	14
99	0,489	68

UN TENTATIVO DI SINTESI (1): IL MODELLO DI SABATIER-MAZMANIAN




FIGURE 1. *Skeletal Flow Diagram of the Variables Involved in the Implementation Process*

UN TENTATIVO DI SINTESI (2): LA TIPOLOGIA DI MATLAND

		CONFLITTO (cosa fare)	
		-	+
AMBIGUITÀ (come fare)	-	<p><i>'Implementazione amministrativa'</i></p> <p>Problema: risorse e 'compliance'</p> <p>Esempio: Debellare la malaria</p>	<p><i>'Implementazione politica'</i></p> <p>Problema: equilibri di potere decisore/agente</p> <p>Esempio: NIMBY</p>
	+	<p><i>'Implementazione sperimentale'</i></p> <p>Problema: contesto, varianza e learning</p> <p>Esempio: Diminuire la disoccupazione giovanile</p>	<p><i>'Implementazione simbolica'</i></p> <p>Problema: contesto + forza delle coalizioni</p> <p>Esempio: Politiche istituzionali</p>

UN TENTATIVO DI SINTESI (3): I GIOCHI DI IMPLEMENTAZIONE

1. Dirottare le risorse:

a) budget, b) vita facile, c) creaming

2. Deviare gli obiettivi:

a) cattura, b) rivincita

3. Resistere:

a) tokenism, b) disobbedienza

NOTA BENE: la discrezionalità è un aspetto ineliminabile e fondante per l'attuazione